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 1 
Summary 
The relationship between Intellectual Property (IP), free movement of goods and 
competition law has always been complex. While IP safeguards an exclusive right that is 
territorial, the free movement of goods and competition principles aim to have free 
competition on the market and at first sight, they seem to be in conflict. Trademark rights 
works as a legitimate barrier for market entry and has the possibility to shut out competitors 
however has the exhaustion principle limit these rights and the European Court of Justice 
has made a distinction between the existence and exercise of IPRs. Exhaustion makes sure 
that once a product is put on the Union market by the proprietor or with their consent, they 
cannot limit competition because their rights are consumed.  
 
It has been established that trademarks have different functions that it is worthy of 
protection, however the question has been raised whether parallel importers or grey 
marketers distorts fair trade and infringes the proprietors rights by affecting these types of 
functions. Parallel trade can cause tension between IPR’s and competition law and 
especially in connection with exclusive licensing. The free movement of goods provisions 
are also relevant in this context due to that they work as the fundamental framework to trade. 
They cover both imports and exports and apply to situation where trade barriers emerge, 
although there are some legitimate justifications for restricting trade. 
 
 Under competition law a trademark can create market power that could be caught under the 
Article 101 of the Treaty Of the Function of the European Union that prohibits agreements 
that distorts competition. IPRs will not distort competition by just existing but the licensing 
of them may give rise to anti-competitive behaviour. The vertical relationships are usually 
exempted from the competition laws but there may be types of restrains that will fall under 
the provisions and especially when having a certain degree of market power. Modern 
technology has changed the market and created new obstacles that may be approached from 
both a free movement and competition law perspective. Because of Internets impact on trade 
it has raised a lot of question about how to apply the classic trademark provisions in a new 
forum.  
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Sammanfattning 
Förhållandet mellan immaterialrätten, fri rörlighet av varor och konkurrensrätt har alltid 
varit komplex. Varumärkesrätten är en territoriellt skyddad exklusivrätt medan fri rörlighet 
av varor och konkurrensrätten strävar efter fri konkurrens på marknaden och vid en första 
anblick kan man få intrycket att dessa principer står i konflikt mot varandra. 
Varumärkesrätten kan fungera som en legitim barriär för att ta sig in på marknaden och kan 
därför utestänga konkurrenter. Däremot har konsumtionsprincipen begränsat dessa 
rättigheter och EU-domstolen har gjort en distinktion mellan existensen och utövandet av de 
immateriella rättigheterna. Konsumtionsprincipen träder in när en produkt lovligen är 
introducerad på den europeiska marknaden av varumärkesinnehavaren eller med dennes 
samtycke och innebär att varumärkesinnehavaren rättigheter har konsumerats.  
 
Varumärkets olika funktioner har ansetts vara skyddsvärda men frågan uppkommer 
huruvida parallell importörer och aktörer från såkallade gråa marknader kan anses snedvrida 
konkurrensen och påverka varumärkens olika funktioner.  Parallell import kan skapa 
spänning mellan immaterialrätten och konkurrensrätten och speciellt i samband med 
exklusiva licensavtal. Reglerna för fri rörlighet av varor blir också relevant i detta 
sammanhang eftersom reglerna fungerar som ett grundläggande ramverk för handel. 
Reglerna omfattar både import och export och tillämpas på situationer där handelshinder 
uppstår däremot finns det legitima skäl för att begränsa handeln i vissa situationer. 
 
Från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv kan ett starkt varumärke innebära en hög grad av 
marknadstyrka som kan fångas upp under Artikel 101 i Fördraget om Europeiska Unionens 
funktionssätt (EUF) som förbjuder avtal som snedvrider konkurrensen på marknaden. Det är 
inte själva existensen av de immateriella rättigheter som anses påverka konkurrensen 
däremot kan licensieringen av dem ge upphov till konkurrensbegränsande beteende. 
Vertikala avtal undantas ofta från konkurrenslagstiftningen men det kan finnas olika 
begränsningar som kan fångas av regleringen speciellt när det är fråga om en aktör med 
marknadstyrka. Teknikens utveckling har förändrat marknaden och skapat nya hinder utifrån 
fri rörlighet samt ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv. Pågrund av att en stor del av handeln 
idag sker på Internet har en hel del frågor uppkommit huruvida man ska tillämpa den 
klassiska varumärkesrätten i förhållande till detta nya handelsforum.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
There are some legitimate barriers to market entry that is construed to the prevention of 
illegitimate competition. They consist of laws and regulatory acts that work as a barrier to 
avoid competitors taking unfair advantage and free riding of someone else’s IP. This can 
however be seen as a problem from a perspective of free movement of goods and 
competition law where you would want to avoid any distortion of competition such as 
opposing parallel trade. This revision extends over several different areas of law but I am 
concentrated in identifying trademarks as a barrier of trade and have therefore pinpointed the 
subject.  
 
The European competition rules are established in the articles 101 and 102 of the treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The competition rules are enforced by the 
European Commission but also by the respective national competition authorities. A main 
competition issue in the European Union (EU) is the barrier to enter the market where 
trademark proprietors prevent others to operate in marketing and cross-border sales between 
the member states.  This examination comes down to the legality of opposing parallel trade 
between different countries and the measures of restricting these type of trade inside the 
European Union. 
 
At the same time as proprietors will want to nourish the main principles of competition, fair 
trade and transparency they would expect their IP assets to be protected against competition 
distortion and unfair competition. Big investments are made in IP and they are worth 
protection. These kinds of different protections of IP rights can also serve as a legitimate 
barrier for market entry. Legal constraints on competition like trademarks can be a strong 
entry barrier. IP takes a special position in this segment. These rights confer upon their 
proprietor the exclusive power to exclude competitors within the scope of rights covered by 
the trademark. The Free movement of goods provisions found in the Articles 34-36 TFEU 
functions as a fundament for all trade in the Union construed to delimit all trade barriers 
concerning state measures.  
 
EU has tried to solve the interaction between the territorial trademark rights and the basic 
Union notion to have a free common market by introducing the principle of regional 
exhaustion. By establishing this principle the court makes sure that trademark proprietors 
cannot invoke their trademark rights to oppose further commercialisation of the goods in the 
community as long as they have put the goods on the EEA market or by their implied 
consent. Parallel imports cannot be prohibited inside the EEA as long as the proprietors 
rights are exhausted. From a trademark proprietors perspective parallel trade can be bad for 
the reputation of a mark due to that its characterized by that the intention for the goods is 
that they would be sold on a different market. Trademark owners usually see parallel 
importers and the so-called grey marketers who buy genuine goods that is intend for another 
market as a problem. However, one must ask themselves if it actually can be beneficial for 
the competition climate and the consumers to allow parallel trade.  
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Internet is a great platform for entering a new market but it has created some new challenges 
for the traditional territorial rights in a climate of a market without boundaries. Trademark 
rights apply to the web and gets primarily relevant in cases concerning distribution, 
trademark use in online market and keyword advertising.  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of the examination is to look at trademark rights as a barrier to market entry. 
Therefore, I will study the circumstances where trademark rights may be a legitimate reason 
for opposing parallel imports of branded goods and why this may be a problem under free 
movement of goods regulations and competition law rules.  
	  
The study shows how barriers of free movement of goods relating to trademark rights can be 
caught under the Articles 34-35 of the Treaty of the Functions of the European Union 
(TFEU) and exempted under article 36 and the mandatory requirements. Article 101 TFEU 
will be reflected upon in the light of the trademark proprietor’s prevention of parallel 
imports in distribution agreements where they would want to control the distribution chain. 
Trademarks owners has considered goods imported by unauthorized distributers and grey 
marketers as an issue but can the opposing be an excuse to reduce competition and create 
trade barriers? Can parallel trade with grey market goods really be seen as contrary to 
trademark law? What positive and negative effects do parallel trade really have on the 
market actors and consumers?    
 
In addition to this, I will look on how the use of exhaustion addresses anti-competitive 
behaviour. The European Court of Justice (CJEU) has in a line of cases dealt with the 
principle regional exhaustion. In connection with parallel import, you must establish when 
you can consider the goods to be put on the market by the proprietor or by their consent but 
also if the trademark proprietor gave their consent to it. Therefore, the notion of consent and 
the putting on the market criterion will be further part of this examination and from what 
circumstances it can be recognized.  
 
Modern technology has complicated this issue further when marketplaces now on a large 
scale are introduced at the web. Therefore, I’m going to look at the issues that this new 
challenge has presented, mainly online distribution, the use of trademarks in online 
marketplaces and keyword advertising. Do the same rules for use of trademarks apply online 
as they do offline?	  
	  
This examination aims to show the interplay between trademark rights, including the 
regional exhaustion principle, with the competition rules and the free movement of goods 
provisions when it comes to parallel imports inside the EEA and from third part countries.  
 
1.3 Method and Limitations 
This thesis follows under a legal dogmatic methodology. This means that relevant legal 
sources have been a big part of the study with the purpose to interpret and analyse the 
current legal status concerning this matter.  To examine the legal grounds for the legitimate 
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barriers for market entry I’ve been using legislation and regulations, case law from the 
European courts, EU directives, articles and other legal doctrine relevant for the analyse. 
 
This issue is wide and covers several field of laws and therefore there is a lot of problems 
arising. More importantly, limitations were needed because of time and space constrains. I 
will not treat the basic parts of competition law or intellectual property rights to any large 
extent. This analysis will focus on parallel imports of branded goods protected by trademark 
rights. Therefore, I will not look at the other IPRs such as patent, copyright and trade secrets 
that may otherwise be relevant in the context of parallel trade.  
 
I will treat parallel imported trademarked goods in its original state and therefore I will not 
touch upon issues concerning counterfeit goods, as the unlawful and intentionally copying of 
another’s IPR, reasonably because it will not give rise to a question of exhaustion.  
 
1.4 Disposition 
The first chapter introduces this thesis and how it will be presented. The second chapter 
contains trademark rights, the provisions protecting the exclusivity of a mark, the different 
functions of a mark and how far the trademark proprietor’s rights stretch in connection to 
parallel trade.  
The third chapter touch upon the principle of regional exhaustion and how the two main 
criterions about consent and goods being putt on the market are applied according to the 
case law from the CJEU. It also extends to the limits of exhaustion and the relationship 
between exhaustion and marketing and repackaging.  
Parallel trade is the subject of chapter four and how it is connected to Intellectual property 
rights and competition law.  
Chapter five contains the provision in Article 34-36 TFEU on free movement of goods and 
how the court has applied it. It mainly covers different trade barriers in connection to 
imports and exports but also the justifications and mandatory requirements.  
The next part in chapter six covers the competition law regulation and the Article 101 
TFEU’s application to different distribution agreement. The 2010 Vertical Regulation and 
hard core provisions is a part of this chapter.  
To tie the exclusivity of trademark rights and the exhaustion principle to parallel trade, free 
movement of goods and competition provision the chapter seven covers online trade and 
new challenges that these technology developments have created for trademark rights when 
it comes to distribution and use of trademarks in the online forum and keyword advertising.   
The last chapter eight discusses the relationship between trademarks and the free movement 
of goods and competition law provisions will be analysed and lead to a conclusion in 
chapter nine on how it is connected and how the interplay works between these different 
areas in law and answer the questions stated in the beginning of this examination.   
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2 Trademark rights 
 
2.1 Trademarks 
Trademarks serve as an identity for goods and services. Brands get recognition through 
trademarks and can communicate the special characters that distinguish the brand from other 
brands. Trademarks are an important asset of a company due to that it will influence 
consumers in their everyday life.  Companies spend a lot of money and time to build a 
strong trademark that will stand out from others.1  However trademark rights can also be 
used against competitors as a legitimate barrier for opposing use of the mark in situations 
like parallel imports.  
 
The enforcement and the protection of IPRs are diverging between countries and this is 
problematic when international trade has become common. International trade rules like the 
Uruguay Round, TRIPS and WTO agreements have been seen as a solution to this problem. 
The approach taken with minimum levels set is to make the IP rules harmonize. The WTO 
rules covers dispute settlements, like enforcement of rights and how they can give adequate 
protection to IP rights.2 
 
The protection for trademarks as an IP right has the possibility to close out any wannabe and 
lookalike competitor from their market. One of the largest barriers for market entry is 
maintaining register trademarks protected from competitors that tries to take unfair 
advantage from already existing providers by taking market shares and consumers. This has 
resulted to a large amount of cases on the interpretation of the Trade Mark directive3, the 
council regulation on the community trademark4 and the national trademark acts. The 
protection for trademarks is the only IP right that has been harmonized at a Union level. The 
Trade Mark Directive solid purpose is to eliminate negative effects on free movement on 
goods like restrictions on free competition.5 The national trademark acts are still limited to 
their respective territory but it must however be seen in the light of the directive. To 
safeguard this article 267 TFEU gives the CJEU the legitimate competence to clarify to 
provisions and create harmonization. 
 
When it comes to parallel imports, the goods are the real deal and the mark is fulfilling its 
function in connection to origin and individualising the goods from others.6 By the article 5 
in the Trade Mark Directive the proprietor of a mark has the exclusive right to use his mark 
in the course of trade but also the right to prevent third parties from using the mark. This 
                                                
1 Office for Harmonization in the internal market. What is a trademark? [2008] Available at: 
2 World Trade Organisation www.wto.org accessed 20 February 
3 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 “approximates” the 
laws of the member states relating to trade marks. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
5 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 “approximates” the 
laws of the member states relating to trade marks. (2) 
6 Schovsbo J,: Graensefladesporgsmål mellan immaterialretten of konkurrensretten, Kobenhavn, PhD thesis, 
Djøf / Jurist- og Økonomforbundet 1996. page.91 
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provision gives the trademark proprietor the right to control their marked goods and also 
prevent parallel imports. However, CJEU has limited these rights by establishing the 
exhaustion principle.7 The form of protection that a proprietor of a registered trademark is 
provided with is against any inappropriate use their trademark. A registration works as proof 
when a proprietor is forced to show their rights to the trademark. This creates obstacles for 
the third party who thinks they have a better right to the trademark because they would have 
to turn to national patent- and registration offices or courts to have it declared invalid, 
among other evidential and procedural obstacles.  
 
It is possible to gain protection for the mark even before it has been used but there must 
however be an intention to make actual use of the mark.8 There is a possibility to file for 
infringement without having to prove that the marks reputation suffered any damage. 
Therefore a strategy construed by using a similar or an identical mark as your competitor is 
somewhat risky and can lead to serious remedies.  
 
An existing registered trademark will be an legitimate barrier for penetrating the market so it 
is important that competitors do their homework so to say and makes research before 
distributing it. It is about assessing whether it is worth taking a risk being sued for trademark 
infringement. The question connected to parallel trade is if the proprietor’s rights extend to 
having the right to oppose unauthorized distributors resale and distribution of their branded 
goods.  
2.2 Trademark functions 
Starting with looking at the trademarks functions, the general function of a trademark is to 
indicate the origin of the product9 and this is also emphasized in the Trade Mark Directive in 
recital 10 that states “the function of which is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an 
indication of origin”.  Nevertheless, it is established that a trademark can imply several 
different functions like reflecting a certain quality10, the advertising function11 and 
investment function12. A well-known trademark proprietor may also think the mark is giving 
them a special edge over their competitors.    
 
A trademark signalizes a certain warranty of the quality of the goods. But this can also mean 
that the trademark proprietor may adjust their products depending on what market they will 
be sold in to compile with the local, economical, culture and social standard. Although these 
also means that when parallel importers bring goods with the same brand into another 
market it may not be adapted to those customs, even though the brand is already established 
there. The consequence can be that the consumer does not get the product they expected, 
                                                
7 See Case C-16/74 Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Pejiper v Winthrop BV [1974] ECR 1183 
8 See Article 10(1) Directive 2008/95/EC Of the European Parliament and of the Council to approximate the 
laws of the Member States relating to Trade Marks. 
9 See Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273  
para 42, 48 and 51 
10 See Cases like Cases C-102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH [1978] ECR-1139; C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v 
Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2002] ECR I-05475 
11 See Case C-323/09 Interflora Inc. and Interflora British Unit v Marks & Spencer plc et Flowers Direct 
Online Ltd. [2011] Not yet published 
12 See Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV [1997] ECR I-
06013 
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because it is adopted for another market and this could reflect badly on the trademarks 
reputation. It can however be repaired by for example labelling the products so the 
consumers know the products is imported by unauthorized distributors channels or grey 
marketers.13 
 
The promotional function of a trademark is usually a large part of the proprietor’s biggest 
investments, to reach out to the new and existing consumers by exposing the goods, by 
promoting and advertising. It is also a way to promote a certain quality of the goods. This 
function may be the proprietors biggest concern due to that unauthorized channel does 
usually not participate in any proportional activates.14 Parallel importers depend on the 
promotional effects done by the trademark proprietors and it therefore becomes a question 
whether this can be seen as free riding?  
  
However is has been discussed if grey market goods can damage these rights. To have in 
mind is that grey market products cannot infringe trademark law because they are not 
counterfeit goods. It is genuine goods that are just imported from another market, as long as 
they do not confuse the consumers and can be identified it is not a violation.15 
 
                                                
13 Hsiu-Li C, “Gray Marketing and Unfair Competition.” Atlantic Economic Journal 
Volume 30, Issue 2, June 2002. Page 3 
14 Ibid., Page 4 
15 Ibid., page 3 
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3 Exhaustion of IPR’s 
 
3.1 Regional exhaustion 
The conflict between trademark rights and the Community’s intentions to create a free  
common market16 are fundamental.  The main principle is to remove all trade barriers and 
distortions of competition and create an internal market. Trademark rights are by their nature 
territorial and can divide the market and threaten the free movement of goods. The CJEU 
has tried to solve this clash between interests by making a distinction between the existence 
and exercise of an IP.17  
 
In EU they have however implemented the “community exhaustion” principle, also called 
regional exhaustion, meaning once a product is sold in one member state there will not be 
any restrains in selling it in another state. The principle was first established by the 
Centrafarm v Winthrop-case18 where a company tried to prohibit parallel imports of their 
goods by invoking their national trademark rights. The CJEU came to the conclusion that as 
long as the proprietor has put the branded goods on the market in a member state or by their 
consent they cannot rely on trademark rights to oppose imports of those goods. It is about 
securing the proprietors exclusive right to put the goods on the market first. The court tried 
to identify the special subject of a trademark.19 This was also the approach of the CJEU in 
the Sterling Drug case20 where the special subject of a trademark was established as the 
value of it, meaning features like goodwill.  
 
The Union goal to have a unified single market does not really compile with the IP rights 
extending to the control of parallel trade. The discussion about opening up the European 
Union to parallel importations has a strong connection to the exhaustion of trademarks.21 
The exhaustion principle meaning the manufacturers rights are exhausted once they sold 
their products for the first time on a market. The trademark proprietors cannot use their IP 
rights to prevent parallel imports from another member state once it has been put on the 
market.22  
 
This principle is now codified in the Trade Marks Directive 2008/95 that states in article 
7(1) that: “the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to 
                                                
16 Article 2 of that Treaty of Rome 
17 Case C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG [1971] 
ECR 00487 
18 Case C-16/74 Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Pejiper v Winthrop BV [1974] ECR 01183 
19 Ibid para 8 
20 Ibid para 50 
21 Lofthus, Kai R., EU Members Unable To Reach Consensus On Parallel Imports. Billboard, 00062510, 
07/03/99, Vol. 111, Issue 27 
22 CMS European Parallel Trade Review [2011] Available at: 
http://www.cmslegal.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/1468644e-bf31-45a7-b6ac-
3452e4aa3e6f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/149dc4e4-7b63-4dd8-9aac-
361b4ff5b3db/CMS_Parallel_Trade_Review_2011.pdf accessed 10 April 2013 
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goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the 
proprietor or with his consent”. Article 7(2) contains the exception from the main provision 
and states that the proprietor of a trademark may have legitimate reasons for refusing further 
commercialisation of their goods; this applies when there have been changes or impairments 
in the conditions. Community trademarks have a corresponding article (13(1)) in Regulation 
2007/200923. The application of legitimate reasons, the placement of the goods on the 
markets and the consent criteria has currently been assessed by the CJEU. The binding 
effects of this provision meaning two parties cannot agree to anything else. 
 
To have in mind is that these provisions do not disclose if they are maximum- or minimum 
standards. Meaning if it should be seen as a minimum requirement member states could 
apply a principle of international exhaustion. However by the EMI judgment24 it was 
established that the provisions couldn’t be used to open up for parallel imports from third 
countries due to the regional character of it.  
 
The so called Silhouette judgement25 established the regional exhaustion principle by 
concluding that member states could not have their own national provisions on exhaustion 
due to that it would affect the free movement on goods in the whole Union. This was further 
developed in the Sebago26 and Davidoff/Levis’s27 cases.  
3.2 “The consent”-criterion 
Exhaustion is dependent on the notion of consent from the trademark proprietor. The first 
placement of the goods on the market must be done by the proprietor or in connection to 
their consent otherwise you cannot say the trademark proprietor’s rights have been 
exhausted. The core issue is for the CJEU is to be able to determine what will be considered 
as consent. Sometimes the concept of consent can be more difficult then it seems.  
 
The relationship has to be considered and the proprietor of the trademark can consent 
through numerous of agreements, like assignments, exclusive distribution and license 
agreements. Especially when it comes to trademarks, the consent criterion is quite unclear.28 
If two undertakings have been economically linked before but independent now the question 
is if they can prohibit imports of the goods on their specific territory becomes tricky. 
Proprietors cannot use their trademark rights to prohibit importation of legitimate 
manufactured goods. At first the CJEU took the parallel traders side by concluding that a 
trademark proprietor cannot oppose marketing of goods when the trademark has common 
origin.29  
 
                                                
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
24 Case C-51/75, C-86/75 and C-96/75 EMI Records v CBS United Kingdom [1976] ECR 0811 
25 Case C- 355/96 Sillhouette International Schmed GmbH & Co. KG v Harlauer Hadelsgesellschaft GmbH 
[1998] ECR I-04799 
26Case C-173/98 Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic SA [1999] ECR I-04103 
27 C-414-416/99 Zino DavIbidoff SA v A & G Imports Ltd and Levi Strauss & Co. and Others v Tesco Stores 
Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-08691 
28 Lidgard HH and Atik, J, The intersection of IPR and Competition Law, Studies in recent developments in 
European and U.S Law. First edition. Intellecta docysus 2008 page 67 
29 Case C-192/73 Van Zuylen Frères v. HAG, AG (“HAG I”) [1974] ECR 731 
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This approach however changes in later cases in front of the court. A proprietor could 
oppose imports even though they had common origin because it could lead to confusion. It 
was an “absence of any element of consent”.30 The reasoning by the CJEU took another step 
in the Ideal Standard case31 and the court said that there were several factors, like the 
likelihood of confusion aspect, to be considered in connection to the consent criterion.  
 
In the line of other CJEU judgement like Silhouette32, Sebago33 and Davidoff/Levi Strauss34 
this more recent case focus on the consent of the trademark proprietor for the sale of goods 
on the Union market.  
 
In the Disel case35 Disel had the trademark rights for the mark DIESEL in the Benelux 
countries and the company Flexi Casual SA got the exclusive rights to sell Diesel branded 
goods in Spain, Portugal and Andorra. The exclusive seller was also allowed to do market 
tests on Diesel shoes. Flexi Casual gave Cosmos World SL the license rights to sell and 
manufacturer shoes, belts and bags with the DIESEL trademark. Flexi Casual did this 
without consent from the Diesels official distributors. Cosmos on their behalf sold the shoes 
with the Diesel mark to the company Makro, who marked them and offered them to sales.  
 
Diesel brought an action against Makro claiming they never consented to the marketing of 
the Diesel shoes and that this was an infringement of trademark rights and copyrights. The 
court referred to the Davidoff /Levi Strauss judgement36 concerning the trademark 
proprietors “implied consent” and if it could be seen as the determine factor of the 
exhaustion of the proprietors rights. The court said that the proprietor must have  
“unequivocally demonstrated” their intent. There is nonetheless an exception to this and it is 
when a party, like a licensee, that have any kind of economic link to the proprietor puts the 
goods on the market.  
 
The CJEU also said that there could be implied consent by the proprietor even though the 
goods are being placed on the EEA market by an undertaking without any economic link 
and the proprietors expressed consent. Where the goods first had been marked was not 
relevant in this context.  
 
This case established that the same criteria for implied consent applies regardless of the 
goods where first marked outside or inside the EEA. But it is also recognized that the 
consent must be unequivocally demonstrated for selling goods inside the EEA. One last 
remark regarding this case is that it was no Advocate General’s opinion, maybe because the 
court regarded this as a straightforward issue.  
                                                
30 Case C-10/89 SA CNL-Sucal NV v Hag GF AG [1990] ECR I-3711 
31 Case C-9/93 IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH and Uwe Danzinger v Ideal-Standard GmbH and Wabco 
Standard GmbH 1994] ECR I-2789 
32 Case C- 355/96 Sillhouette International Schmed GmbH & Co. KG v Harlauer Hadelsgesellschaft GmbH 
[1998] ECR I-04799 
33 Case C-173/98 Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic SA [1999] ECR I-04103 
34 C-414-416/99 Zino DavIbidoff SA v A & G Imports Ltd and Levi Strauss & Co. and Others v Tesco Stores 
Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-08691 
35 Case C-324/08 Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel CV and others v Disel SpA [2009] ECR I-10019 
36 C-414-416/99 Zino DavIbidoff SA v A & G Imports Ltd and Levi Strauss & Co. and Others v Tesco Stores 
Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-08691 
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3.3 “The putting on the market”-criterion 
If a proprietor only has the intention to import goods for sales, advertising or selling them 
but without making realisation of selling the goods inside the EEA their rights cannot be 
exhausted as stated in the Peak Holdings-case.37 Having the result that the proprietor’s right 
cannot be used by third parties under those circumstances. Just because a proprietor has 
given their consent for marketing of a type of goods, it does not mean that all goods that the 
proprietor handles are covered by that special consent, having the practical meaning that 
every type of goods must have an expressed consent for the importation of those.38 As stated 
in Sebago39 and Silhouette40 goods that are placed on the market outside the EEA does not 
lead to the exhaust of the proprietor’s rights and they may oppose parallel imports. 
 
In the Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v Simex Trading AG ruling41 the putting on the 
market requirement was studied in relation to testers of perfumes who were used at 
demonstrations of the products and also marked with a label that stated “not for sale”. Coty a 
manufacturer of perfumes owned the mark Davidoff, that was sold under a selective 
distributions system. The perfume tester was a part of the material Coty provided to its 
distributors for advertising and marketing purposes. Under the contracts, they had explicitly 
stated that commercial use of tester products was forbidden.  
 
A third party supplier, Simex, provided testers of the Davidoff perfumes to a German outlet. 
Coty sued Simex for trademark infringement due to that the testers were originally from 
Singapore and they had put the goods on the EEA market without their consent. The CJEU 
started with stating that the goods where first put on the EEA market by Simex and not by 
the trademark proprietor or with their consent. Therefore, there could not be any exhaustion 
of Coty’s trademark rights if it could not been shown there was a consent demonstrated 
unequivocally as stated in the Davidoff/Levi Strauss-case.  
 
The court takes the view that the trademark proprietor made it clear that there was no 
consent due to the markings “not for sale” and “demonstration” of the products and that this 
is evidence enough. Also by the agreement the tester products were still owned by the 
proprietor and the distributors where prohibited to sell them. Finally, the goods were 
package different then the originals and the CJEU takes account to all of this and interprets 
this as a sign that they were not giving their consent.  
 
This case clearly shows that trademark proprietors should take these safety steps to avoid 
any confusion of what the intent with the goods are although the consent test is generally 
seen as stringent.  
 
                                                
37 Case C-16/03 Peak Holdings AB v Axolin-Elinor AB, formely Handelskompaniet Factory Outlet in 
Löddeköping AB [2004] ECR I-11313 para 41 
38 Case C-173/98 Sebago Inc. And Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic SA [1999] ECR I-4103 
39 Ibid 
40 Case C- 355/96 Sillhouette International Schmed GmbH & Co. KG v Harlauer Hadelsgesellschaft GmbH 
[1998] ECR I-04799 
41 Case C-127/09 Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v Simex Trading AG [2010] ECR I-04965 
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3.4 The limit to exhaustion  
The “consent”-criterion and the “putting on the market”-criterion must be fulfilled for the 
exhaustion principles to apply, however the exhaustion principle has some limits to its 
application. Those are connected to the rights to performance, compulsory licensing and the 
transit of goods. However due to that this examination covers trademarks the limit for the 
exhaustion principle relating to transfer of the goods will be in question. 
 
The specific subject matter of a trademark cannot have been breached if the transfer of the 
goods does not include marketing and therefore it is permitted as stated in the Rioglass and 
Transremar judgment.42 Thus according to the Colgate-Palmolive-case43 may a trademark 
proprietor oppose the selling of the goods if it is due to customs warehouse procedure or an 
external transit. Restrictions can be carried out if it is a matter of third party making an 
external transfer that necessarily puts the goods on the market in a member state.44  
 
3.5 Repackaging and Marketing 
Repackaging and marketing affects trademark rights and the exhaustion principle. 
Repackaging is often done by taking the goods away from their original box or container 
and trading it to another, usually to comply with national standards like for an example a 
fixed number of pills per package. Obviously, this procedure is affecting the trademark in a 
manner that maybe affects the original function of the mark.  
 
In the Hoffman la-Roche case45 the CJEU looked at the question whether a proprietor 
abused his trademark rights by precluding parallel imports. The goods in this case had been 
re-packaged without the trademark owner’s explicit consent and therefore they claimed that 
it abolished the original function of the mark and quality of the goods concerned. The CJEU 
focused on the trademark functions instead of the concern about consent and came to the 
conclusion that the proprietor may contest imports of these kinds of goods as long as it does 
not artificially dived the market. However the goods were not affected by the repackaging 
and also they had clearly shown that repackaging had been done.  
 
If the repackaging is necessary for entering the market, it is permitted as established by the 
CJEU.46 Even though the repackaging cannot jeopardize the reputation of the mark and only 
aim to institute a commercial advantage. It is also established by the Court that the new 
labelling should not affect the product itself and the importer must give prior notice before 
putting out it for sale. It is not about the manner and style of the repackaging it is about the 
                                                
42 Case C-115/02 Administration des douanes et droits indirects v Rioglass Sa and Transremar [2003] ECR I-
12705 
43 Case C-405/03 Class International BV v Colgate-Palmolive Co [2005] ECR I-8735 
44 Case C-281/05 Montex Holdings Ltd v Diesel SpA [2006] ECR I- 10881 
45 Cases C-102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer 
Erzeugnisse mbH [1978] ECR-1139 para 54 
46 See Joined Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova A/S, C-429/93 C. H. Boehringer Sohn, 
Boehringer Ingelheim KG. Boehringer Ingelheim A/S v Paranova A/S, Bayer C-436/93 Aktiengesellschaft and 
Bayer Danmark A/S mot Paranova A/S [1996] I-03457 
 16 
necessity of it for the goods to be commercialised on that specific market. Also it is found 
that poor quality and defective repackaging is not enough to prevent commercialisation.47 
 
One of the most important functions of a trademark is to advertise goods to the public and 
create a reputation. In the Centrafarm v American Home judgment48 in was established that 
“rights granted to the proprietor to prohibit any unauthorized affixing of his mark to his 
product accordingly comes within the specific subject matter of the trademark”. 
Consequently supporting that the marketing in another member states had no meaning. It 
can however constitute a restriction on trade.49  
 
Hens are the trademark proprietor’s rights limited to the changes that are essential for 
allowing parallel importers to market their products.50 It is however important that the 
consumers will not get misled to think the parallel importer is the owner and the 
manufacturer of the mark.51 The proprietor of a trademark cannot appose advertising done 
by an unauthorized dealer that is custom to their business sector unless it can seriously 
damage the reputation of the trademark.52 
 
 
                                                
47 Case 348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Others v Swingward Ltd and Dowelhurst Ltd [2007] I-03391 
48 Case C-3/78 Centrafarm BV v American Home Products Corporation [1978] ECR 1823 
49 Wood L, Free movement of Goods and Services within the European Community. First edition. Ashgate 
Publishing Limited 2004. Page 152 
50 Joined cases C-427, 429 and 436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb [1996] ECR I-03457  para 56 
51 Ibid para 74 
52 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV [1997] ECR I-
06013. See also article 7(2) of the Trade Mark Directive 
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4 Parallel trade 
4.1 Defining parallel trade 
 
Parallel trade is when a wholesaler are selling products to another market then what products 
were intended to be produced for. It is arbitrage where prices are different between different 
countries. This may depend on several factors, like price discrimination or simply barging 
power in the respective countries. On a national market parallel trade is legal even though 
there can be regional prices levels.  The TRIPS agreement allows the member states to 
decide whether parallel imports should be allowed.53  
 
Fair competition can be defined as companies endorsing their market shares under fair 
conditions the question in connection to trademark rights is if parallel trade can be seen as 
taking unfair advantage of a proprietors mark and if it can be considered as unfair 
competition. IP rights may protect the proprietor of the trademark. What characterizes 
parallel trade is that the manufacturer and owner of the IPR do not have the intention to have 
their goods sold on another market. In that second market the goods would be defined as 
“grey market goods” or “parallel imports”. The term grey markets where chosen due to that 
it is not entirely lawful but it is not what has been described as a black market either.54 
 
Trade is usually attractive when specific goods are cheaper on one market and the cost is 
higher in another. The trader must however be able to cover costs like shipping, import 
duties, margin of profit amongst other cost for them to want to meet the risks by doing this 
kind of trade. The risks the sellers are facing would include market swings, currency 
variation etc. These costs may be considered as barriers of free trade in the world and 
therefore may lead to distorted resource allocation. There have been attempts to reduce 
barriers that could be seen as unnecessary to be able to instead encourage trade.55 One 
example of this is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that has created several agreements 
“directed to the substantial reductions of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”.56 
 
One of the European Community’s (EC) main goals is to remove unnecessary trade barriers. 
Many has barriers to trade has been eliminated but there is still several left to consider. The 
necessity of a certain barrier can been hard to decide.57As mentioned parallel imports and 
grey marketing has been seen as an issue in the eyes of the proprietors. The main issue at 
stake here is what the trademark owners believe their rights include and what unauthorized 
distribution channels have the right to do. To have in mind is that grey markets is not usually 
considered as unlawful, it is not like black markets that is definitely illegal because of 
counterfeit or stolen goods. The manufacturing of the grey market goods is not the real issue 
                                                
53 See article 6 of the TRIPS agreement 
54 Stothers C, Parallel trade in Europe. Intellectual Property, Competition and Regulatory Law. First edition. 
Hart Publishing. 2007 page 150 
55 Ibid page 1 
56 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the Word Trade Organisation 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, preamble.  
57 Stothers C, Parallel trade in Europe. Intellectual Property, Competition and Regulatory Law. First edition. 
Hart Publishing. 2007 page 2 
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but it is rather a matter of unauthorized distribution. An unauthorized distributor sells 
marked goods without the trademark proprietor’s consent.58  
 
 
4.2 Parallel trade in connection to IPR’s and 
competition law 
Parallel trade can cause tension between IP laws and competition law.  When looking from a 
competition law perspective a manufacturer who has granted a wholesaler an exclusive 
territory cannot be putting restrains in a contract to shut out competitors. Parallel trade is 
fairly seen as a breach of competition law. Usually exclusive territories are seen with harsh 
eyes if it aims to keep any kind of price discrimination. From the proprietors view arbitrage 
may be prohibited. However, the rules of exhaustion are relevant in connection to this and it 
means that the seller’s rights are exhausted when selling their product.  
 
IP Proprietors has previously been able to carry out price discriminations by contractual 
obligations prohibiting their goods to be exported/imported between markets both in Europe 
and North America.  In the US “the first sale doctrine” has been established, meaning the 
sold goods will not be in the original owners control when it has been sold but also parallel 
trade with trademarked goods are unlawful.59 
 
There are several economical theories of parallel trade. When it comes to parallel trade in 
relation to trademarks there has been a lot of controversy. A leading authority in the Union, 
Justice Laddie has taken the view that the trademarks fundamental purpose is to 
communicate with the consumer on the origin of the products and by that letting trademark 
proprietors extend their IP rights to ban parallel trade would give them a “parasitic right to 
interfere with the distribution of goods which bears little or no relationship to the proper 
function of the trademark right”.60 
 
Also even other scholars have taken a similar approach; they think this will serve as a 
creation of exclusive territories when restricting parallel trade. Competition law rules should 
be a part of the examination of contractual issues that may form exclusive territories. They 
wish to give the consumers on high price markets the possibility to get products that are 
cheaper on other markets. However to have in mind is that these arguments does not take to 
count to the fact that consumers may gain from price discrimination when they instead lead 
to low prices and therefore can parallel trade have a negative impact.61  
  
IP rights have the goal to encourage investments, investments to build a brand and create 
new products. Therefore, the investment argument is import to have in mind. The 
Silhouette-case62 resulted in a limit of parallel import into the European market. In practice 
                                                
58 Ibid., 
59 Tariff Act 1930 
60 Zino DavIbidoff SA v A&G Import Limited CH-1998 D No. 4517, paragraph 36. 
61 Hsiu-Li C, “Gray Marketing and Unfair Competition.” Atlantic Economic Journal 
Volume 30, Issue 2, June 2002. Page 2 
62 Case C- 355/96 Sillhouette International Schmed GmbH & Co. KG v Harlauer Hadelsgesellschaft GmbH 
[1998] ECR I-04799 
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meaning traders from grey markets were stopped importing branded products at lower 
prices. The trademark proprietors argued that the unauthorized parallel trade injured their 
investments and authorized distribution channels. They also claimed parallel trade damaged 
consumers who paid full price for the goods. However, the protest against this decision 
came from consumers, discount retailers and parallel importers. This led to the possibility 
for trademark proprietors to use their IP right to manipulate the market activities but also the 
price on the European market.63  
4.3 The common sales law 
The current status consists of companies forced to adapt to all the different national contract 
laws if they want to do any cross-border dealings. This means that every time a company 
would want to make a cross-border transaction they would have to hire national lawyer, 
make a translation of the rules and undertake many additional costs. Also in a consumer 
perspective, the Europeans could have more choices if the laws and regulations at stake 
would be harmonized.64 
 
The European Commission has published a purposed directive concerning contractual law 
issues also referred to as the Regulation on a Common European Law of sales (CESL)65 The 
directive gives companies optional contractual rules when dealing with cross-border affairs. 
If the directive on common European sales law gets implemented in the national 
jurisdictions the barrier for market entry will be affected. The European parliament has 
supported this kind of direction. The existing national laws are not getting replaced if the 
directive is implemented; it is rather a legal framework for the creation of a single European 
market.  The purpose of the common sales law directive is to simplify cross-boarder sales. 
This is also justified under a consumer perspective making it easier to choose of a wide 
range of different brands.  
 
If the directive would be applied, it would cover the whole contractual process as pre-
contractual matters, obligations of the parties, the final contract, rights to withdraw it, all 
obligations and rights due to the contract but also remedies. The regulation only covers 
contracts for sales of goods and when both parties have agreed to base their agreement on 
the proposed directive. Also one of the parties must be based one of the European member 
states for the directive to be applicable.  
4.4 The relationship between trademark rights and 
parallel trade 
A proprietor of a trademark will invest a lot of time and money in building up a trademark 
that distinguish their brand from other companies on the market. However it is important 
that the proprietor’s rights do not extend to the point that it closes out competition that can 
be healthy for the market and the consumers. To have in mind when looking at this issue is 
                                                
63 Hsiu-Li C, “Gray Marketing and Unfair Competition.” Atlantic Economic Journal 
Volume 30, Issue 2, June 2002. Page 1. 
64 Kolah A, Essential Law for Marketers. Second edition. Taylor and Francis. 2013 Page 93 
65 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law 
[COM(2011) 635 final - 2011/0284 (COD)] 
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that the trademark directive and the rules on competition and free movement of goods rules 
have the same goal and that is to eliminate negative effects on free movement of goods and 
the restrictions on free competition. By the first look trademark rights are territorial and 
exclusive rights that may divide the market. Parallel trade and the trademark different 
functions are closely connected.  
 
To have in mind when looking at the context of these trademark function is that there are 
some matters that can be in question as Chen Hsiu-Li discusses in his book Marketing and 
Unfair competition.66 Can parallel importers breach trademark law when the labelling 
clearly shows the products origin and content and the consumers realize this after they 
obtained the product? And are the consumers being deceived when the products value is 
lesser then the consumer may think? First of all he has the opinion that you cannot expect 
the grey markers to do more then to label the products with the ingredients and origin of the 
products even though a consumer is not aware until after the purchase. Also you might say 
the consumers are getting compensated by the cheaper price they pay. 
 
Another question that he considers should be debated is whether a grey marketer should 
have to share their promotional costs with the trademark proprietor and the authorized 
distributors? Mr Chen has the opinion that it is obvious that the one’s conducting parallel 
trade are benefiting from the advertising effects and are to say free riding on their 
investments. The solution could then be to come to some kind of agreement between the 
interest parties and the unauthorized distributors to share the cost for advertising.  
 
In addition, he discusses whether it could be said that parallel importers distort fair trade. 
Could it be considered as unfair competition? He states that from a general starting point 
parallel import gives the consumer a wider range of goods and service to choose from with a 
more differing price range. Therefore, the focus from the trademark proprietors should 
maybe be to ban counterfeit goods and not the sales of genuine products even though they 
come from unauthorized channels.  
 
Mr Chen has some interesting thoughts and solutions to some of the issues that proprietors 
raise in discussions about parallel trade. He lifts the consumer perspective and the benefits 
with parallel trade for the market in general. The consumers would benefit from the price 
pressure that comes with parallel imports that creates price competition between the 
distributors he says. Another argument from the parallel importers is that it would intensify 
international trade. On one hand the trademark proprietor considers these grey markets as 
free riders due to that they benefit from the advertising made without contributing but on the 
other hand could the pressure from the parallel importers make the real trademark 
proprietors change their strategy, reduce their cost and make their own business efficient. If 
this would be the effect, it is beneficial for social welfare as Chen also concludes.  
 
                                                
66 Hsiu-Li C, “Gray Marketing and Unfair Competition.” Atlantic Economic Journal 
Volume 30, Issue 2, June 2002. Page 1 
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5 Free movement of goods 
5.1 The free movement of goods provisions 
 
Parallel trade and trade in general provisions are found in article 34 and 35 TFEU. For the 
internal markets development are the free movement of goods a key element and on of the 
economic freedoms set by the EC treaty. The principles on prohibiting unjustified 
restrictions on internal Union trades scope and contents are found in the EC treaty’s articles 
28-30. The principle of free movement of goods has been framed by legislation in specific 
areas but the treaty provisions are still seen as a fundamental key for the internal market. An 
extensive removal of trade barriers have been executed but the fact is that some still 
remains. Especially Small Medium Enterprises (SME’s) are affected due to that they must 
cope with different national rules that have not been harmonized by the Union. Also some 
trade restrictions are being enlightening because of the new technology as Internet sales.67 
 
Articles 34-36 are working as a fundament for the free movement of goods but there is a lot 
of areas where specific regulations exists where regulations or directives have been adopted 
by the European member states. There are also areas that are covered by specific treaty rules 
like the tax related-rules in article 110 TFEU. Therefore, those concrete rules concerning a 
specific area must be observed on first hand and not the broad principles of the treaty.68  
 
Both imports and exports of goods are covered by the articles 34 and 35 TFEU. The 
provisions are applicable on all goods with an economic value.69 Therefore, it could be 
important in a legal manner to define whether something is covered by the free movement of 
goods provisions and do not fall within the freedom to provide services.  
 
Articles 34-35 TFEU are only applicable to cross-border issues, in other words the measure 
taken must be capable of indirect or potentially hindering intra-EU trade.70 Re-import, 
meaning when domestic goods are exported and imported back, are covered by article 3471 
however not in the case where the sole purpose of it is only to avoid domestic regulations.72  
As long as the goods are on the internal market it does not matter where they were 
manufactured to enjoy the free movement of goods principle.  
                                                
67 Free Movement Of Goods. Guide to the application of Treaty provisions governing the free movement of 
goods. European Commission. [2010] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-
goods/free-movement-non-harmonised-sectors/index_en.htm accessed 1 April 2013 page 8 
68 Case C-309/02 Radberger Getränkegesellschaft and S-Splitz [2004] ECR-I-11763 para 53 
69 Case C-7/68 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1968] ECR 423 
70 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 para 5 
71 Case C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG [1971] 
ECR 487 
72 Case C-229/83 Association des Centres distributeurs Édouard Leclerc and others v SARL "Au blé vert" and 
others. [1985] ECR 00001 
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5.2 Imports 
The provisions are applicable on measures taken by Member states, it has however been 
broadly interpreted to cover all relevant authorities and public authorities of member state.73 
Article 34 can be invoked in both situations where the state has actively hindered cross-
border trade but also in cases where they have in inactive. An example of when the state 
where inactive is when French farmers tried to restrict imports of agriculture goods from 
other member states and the state did nothing to stop these actions and therefore infringed 
the article.74  
 
A “quantitative restrictions” can mean things like quota systems or a ban75 and has been 
defined as some kind of measure that restrains imports of goods in transit.76 The “Measures 
having equal effect” part is broad in its scope it has been defined as “All trading rules 
enacted by member states which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”77 Meaning that that the measure does not necessary 
have to be discriminatory but that there is other barriers to trade of goods between states. It 
has also been established that the article covers measures that are equal to imported and 
domestic goods, but that effects imports more.78 This formula has however been limited to 
not challenge provisions with social and welfare intentions.79  
 
Selling arrangements that are discriminatory in law or in fact does fall within the provisions. 
Selling arrangement may include the labelling or packaging obligation80 but also a 
restriction on advertising.81 Three general principles that has to be considered in connection 
to article 34; First the principle on non-discrimination, secondly the mutual recognition 
principle and last the principle on free access of community goods on national markets.82  
 
The mutual recognition principle allows national systems to keep on having different 
technical requirement for goods.83 The principle means that goods marked and manufactured 
lawfully in one members state shouldn’t be prohibited in another member state. 
Justifications are to be grounded on article 36 TFEU, containing justifications on protection 
of public security, morality and protection of health and life etc. In relation to this stands the 
principle of proportionality. The Union has adopted a Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 relating 
                                                
73 Joined cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA and Publivía SAE v Departamento 
de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluña [1991] ECR I-4151 
 
74 Case C-265/95 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1997] ECR I-6959 
75 Case C-2/73 Riseria Luigi Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi [1073] ECR 856 
76 Case C-13/68 SpA Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade, Rome 1968] ECR 453 
77 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 
78 Case C-110/05 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [2009] ECR I-519 para 35 
79 Joined cases C-267/91 & 268/91 Bernad Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 para 15-16 
80 Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v. Eco-Emballages SA [2002] ECR I-5031 
81 Case C-412/93 Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA1995] 
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to goods that has been legitimately marked in another member state and the national 
technical regulation.  
5.3 Trade barriers 
5.3.1 Import barriers 
Some trade barriers seem to have emerged in several cases concerning the articles 34-36 
TFEU. I will describe some of them that relates to the subject of this thesis.  
5.3.2 Price controls 
The CJEU has confirmed that article 34 applies to states having price control regulations 
like for example maximum/minimum prices, maximum/minimum profit margins etc. If a 
member state set a minimum price it could affect imports more because the selling price 
does not get reflected on the low cost price and their competition advantage vanish. This is 
negative from a consumer perspective because the price is higher than I could be.84  Fixed 
minimum/maximum profit margins can be infringing article 34 when not allowing the costs 
for imports of goods.85 However from the Keck and Mithourard-case86 the court considered 
national price controls as a selling arrangement due to that they apply to all traders within 
the territory and therefore does not get caught by the article 34. 
5.3.3 Prior authorization 
Prior authorization can create barriers to importers and be seen as a quantitative restriction 
under article 34 TFEU. It can however in some circumstances be justified, like when it is 
based on non-discriminatory and objective criteria that are known and it should not be the 
same control already done in the manufacturing country.  
5.3.4 Labelling and advertising of goods 
Regarding shape, size and presentation requirements, it could be considered as a measure 
having equivalent effect under article 34 TFEU. The requirements must however be 
connected with the product itself. Measures like those that requiring margarine to have 
cubical packaging has been seen as going against article 34 by the CJEU.87  
 
In addition, the requirements on advertising are also covered. The approach to advertising 
has varied, sometimes making it fall into certain selling arrangement and therefore has to 
determine if it is discriminatory88 but it has also been seen as measures that correspond to 
the products.89 There are three main steps that the court goes trough in advertising cases: 
First establishing that the advertising are a type of selling arrangement, in the second step 
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they look at the advertising scope if it can be considered as an prohibition and at last they 
consider the discrimination in other words if marketing goods coming from outside the state 
are affected differently comparing to the national ones.90   
 
5.3.5 Origin and quality marks 
Requirements to mark to goods with origin can constitute a measure of equivalent effect and 
can therefore be against article 34. Labelling showing origin and quality under promotional 
activities can influence free movement of goods due to that it can make consumer to choose 
domestic products over imported one’s.91 It can however be legitimate to have national rules 
on origin and quality in connection to geographical indications that shows the goods special 
qualities.92 In the Buy Irish-case93 the state tried to reduce imports by promoting domestic 
goods and thereforee infringed article 34. If the consumer risks being misled it can also be 
justified to use labelling or packaging to prevent it.  
5.3.6 Language requirements 
In the Colim-case94 the court concluded that changing labelling due to language 
requirements could be prohibited by article 34. Consumer protection is not a justification in 
this matter when it is prior the sales to the end consumers. However the case my be different 
when talking about sales to the end consumers and several different factor may have to be 
taken into count, like general knowledge of languages for example. The important part here 
is that the consumer is provided with sufficient information about the goods.95  
 
5.3.7 Distance selling 
The increasing trade through Internet sales mail ordering etc has lead to some new 
challenges for the market. In the Deutscher Apothekerverband-case96 there was a question 
whether a ban of Internet sales of medical goods was opposite to article 34 TFEU. As to the 
keck and Mithouard-case97 this was defined as a selling arrangement and therefore it has to 
be discriminatory to be considered a restrictive measure. The court’s conclusion was that 
due to the importance of Internet sales for new products to be able to gain direct access to a 
new market and that the ban affected non-domestic products more effectively then domestic 
ones and therefore they had breached article 34.98 Although they pointed out that the ban 
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could be justified of healthy- and social security reasons but only in connection to 
prescription medicines. 99 
5.4 Export barriers 
The article 35 TFEU applies on restrictions on exports between member states. The scope of 
the provision does not extent to cover exports to countries outside the Union. The 
similarities between the import- and export restriction ban article 34 and 35 are clear but 
there is a important distinction between the provisions. Article 35 covers only discriminatory 
measures on goods as established in the Groenveld-case100, giving domestic goods an 
advantage. The reason for the more narrow interpretation is that exporters do only have to 
comply with the domestic rules compared to importers who may be caught with a dual 
burden of rules. In addition, would a wide interpretation of the article also include other 
restriction that has no intra-EU trade connection.101 The court has dealt with several cases 
concerning better conditions for domestic companies and the main formula used by the court 
is “at the expense of the production or of the trade of other member states”.102 In other 
words, article 35 applies when the treatment is different between domestic goods coming 
from outside the state and when there is an actual effect on the exports.  
 
5.5 Justifications under article 36 
Through Article 36 TFEU restrictions of imports and exports can be justified. Justifications 
can be done on grounds like public security, morality, health and life of humans, protection 
of commercial and industrial property, protections of plants and animals etc. These must 
however be seen in the light of the principle of proportionality. The listing in article 36 does 
not relate to economical interests.103 Apart from the listing, the second part of the article 
with the wording “constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on trade between member states” makes sure that member states cannot abuse the 
justifications to the point that it serves the right purpose. 
 
When public morality has been used as a justification it is usually a question of obscene 
goods or mixed with other justifications like public interests like gambling and protection of 
minors. It is however not possible to invoke a justification on morality if it is not already 
prohibited in the domestic market.  
 
Using public policy as a justification has not been easy due to the CJEU has interpreted it 
strictly. Usually has the public policy justification only been successful when used in 
connection to other justifications.104 Public security as a justification has been used in the 
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area of EU energy markets105 and on the grounds of public security dual use goods106 and 
sensitive goods107 has been accepted.  
 
The protection for industrial and commercial property means the protection of design rights, 
trademarks, patents and copyrights but also graphical denominations.108 The main principle 
is that the industrial property rights will not be affected by the Treaty. National provision 
may contain transfer, extinction and acquisition of those rights. However if there is some 
kind of discrimination element in those national rules this is not applicable.109 The 
exhaustion principle applies when goods are put on the market in one state in the Union 
market. The proprietor cannot oppose the goods being imported into another member states. 
However, the proprietors are able to collect royalties for the performance or rental of the 
goods.110 Harmonised legislation however covers these scenarios and an example of that is 
the Directive 89/104/EC on trademarks.  
5.6 Mandatory requirements 
A non-exhaustive list of interests worthy of protection in the connection with article 34 was 
established by the CJEU in the Cassis de Dijon-case111. This made it possible to invoke 
justifications on indistinctly applicable rules meaning if something was seen as 
discriminatory under article 36 these justifications could not be used. One mandatory 
requirement is protection of the environment due to that it is “one of the community’s 
essential objectives”.112 Consumer protection has also been established as a mandatory 
requirement however it must be applicable to both domestic and imported goods in the same 
manner and cannot be unnecessarily restrictive.113 Other mandatory requirements has been 
established by the CJEU’s case law, like culture aims114, improvement of working 
conditions115, road safety116, financial balance of the social security system117, press 
diversity118, animal welfare119 and the fight against crime120.As mentioned before the 
justifications under article 36 must be proportional, in another words the measures has to be 
necessary and they could not have achieved the objectives with less extensive provisions. 
The mandatory requirements are non-exhausted and therefore new one’s can appear in future 
case law.  
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6 Competition law 
6.1 The competition rules 
IPR’s creates exclusive rights to their proprietors and can also secure them a certain degree 
of market power. Both parallel trade and exhaustion reduces these rights to enhance 
competition. Competition law is created to safeguard so there is so no distortion of 
competition on the market and to prohibit anti-competitive behaviour.121 It aims to promote 
innovation and secure so the consumers has a wide range of choices and lower prices. The 
issue with IPR’s from a competition law perspective is that they create exclusive and 
territorial rights for their proprietors. These characteristics speak against the creation of a 
single market.  However, you can argue that IPR’s and competition law are complementing 
each other. Usually trademarks are seen as pro-competitive due to the transparency it gives 
the market and information it provides for the consumers. 
 
Competition law aims to have efficiency on the market by allocating the resources on the 
market. If an act harms the society as a whole, it will be considered as an anti-competitive 
act. In the Costa v ENEL judgement122 the court stated that Community law has supremacy 
over national legislation. Meaning IPR rights cannot stand in conflict with the fundamental 
aim of the Union, free competition.   
 
The relevant competition rules are found in article 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 101 aims to 
prohibit agreements between undertakings that distort competition. The article 101(3) 
contains an individual exemption allow parties to avoid the first paragraphs of the article. 
While article 102 makes sure that undertakings having dominant position does not use their 
dominance to distort competition. The Commission has established competition as a 
“fundamental principle” of law.123  
 
The relationship between Competition law and IPR has been described in terms, which 
suggest that an IPR could never constitute an abuse of a dominant position under article 102 
TFEU.124 It can nonetheless confer a dominant position. The same reasoning is considering 
article 101 establishing that the IPR in itself cannot infringe the competition rules but a 
license can give rise to the application of those.  
 
Competition rules can catch agreement and the free movement provisions has to be seen in 
the light of the competition regulation as stated in the Consten and Grundig decision125 
meaning that even though an agreement is not caught by the free movement rules it can still 
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be infringing article 101.126 On the other way around may an agreement that does not affect 
competition in any large scale still be threatening the free movement of goods.127  
 
The Technology Transfer Block Regulation (TTBER)128 does not cover trademarks unless 
the licensing is ancillary to the technology covered by the Technology Block Exemptions.129 
6.2 Article 101(1) 
Article 101(1) captures agreement between undertakings, the term undertaking are not 
defined by the treaty but has been interpreted widely by the competition authorities and the 
Union Courts and an undertaking has been defined as entities involved in any economical 
activity irrespective of how they are financed or their legal status.130  
 
The second part to have in mind when applying article 101(1) is that there must be some 
kind of agreement, decision or concerted practice. The wide applicability has it explanation 
in that it is necessary to catch less formal agreements that are anti-competitive. It is about at 
least two parties and an expression of their common intentions.131 Concerned practice covers 
those agreements that lacks physical evidence where there is a collusion between 
undertakings nonetheless.132  
 
To be able to apply article 101(1) there has to be an agreements, decision or concerned 
practice that has the object or the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition 
on the relevant market. Usually the issue with restricting parallel trade will arise under a 
vertical relationship. The defence is often that their actions are unilateral and therefore 
Article 101(1) should not be applicable. However the commission and EU courts has taken 
the view that the type of conducts that will be considered as an agreement or a concerted 
practice is when an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor prohibits exports or 
parallel imports.133  
 
Parallel trade may also be restricted by a horizontal agreement between competitors. 
Although this is not as common due to that a manufacturer rarely needs another 
undertakings help to constrain parallel imports of their goods. These types of agreements fall 
outside the application of article 101(1) if they are unilateral. This does nevertheless not 
mean that the unilateral conduct is allowed due to that it can have the consequence that 
justifications under article 101(3) will not be permitted.134  
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Article 101(1) is not applicable if there is no effect on trade between member states, and 
then it is not a matter for the Union. The STM case provided for the test on whether it was 
likely to “foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set objective 
factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or 
indirect, actual or potential, on the patterns of trade between member states.”135 The 
agreement must be capable of having an effect however there is no need to show that it had 
an actual effect on trade.136  
 
The de minimis doctrine is also relevant in connection to whether an agreement will be 
caught by article 101(1).  If the parties are actually or potentially competitors the market 
share cannot exceed 10 per cent on the relevant market. The corresponding number for non-
competitors is 15 per cent on the relevant market.137 
6.3 Distribution agreements 
Distribution agreements are usually exempted from competition rules due to that they rarely 
raise any anti-competitive concerns. Distribution agreements meaning undertakings on 
different levels in the distribution chain, it is usually a question about a manufacturer who 
grants another undertaking sales and marketing rights. Its custom that the relationship is 
exclusive in the sense that the manufacturer grants rights in specific territories and the 
parties stick to the assign territory.  It is a vertical relationship due to that the manufacturer 
and distributors function on different levels138 and anti-competitive behaviour is therefore 
reduced because of the inter-brand competition between similar products that origin from 
different producers. However, the exclusivity of the relationships can affect competition by 
reducing the number of undertakings participating.139 
 
There are many different types of distribution agreements. Commercial agents works on 
behalf of another undertaking and has the power to conclude agreements and negotiate but 
without the commercial risk. Exclusive distributors work independently in their own name 
and get a specific territory assigned.  Selective distribution provides for a system where only 
distributors who fulfil certain criteria may sell the products. It is usually a question of 
distributors who can uphold the brands prestige or provide service for the goods. Another 
type is franchising where a license is based on the know-how and trademark but it can also 
include supplying of goods.  
 
Agreement between producers and distributors can contain clauses that prohibit parallel 
trade but this is less common now due to the commissions and EU courts approach to the 
issue.140 More common methods now days are refusing to supply some parallel exports, 
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asking distributors not to export etc. Usually the producers will claim that the behaviour is 
unilateral. Also non-contractual documents can be considered as an agreement and fall into 
the Article 101(1) prohibition.141  
 
The vertical guidelines recognize nine points where vertical restrains may be justified. They 
include things like avoiding free riding, first time investments and standardization. The free-
riding issue relates to unauthorized distributors that free ride on an undertakings promotion 
and advertising activities without paying for it. Sometimes a territorial protection can be 
justified due to recouping a first time investment to establish a trademark in a market also a 
uniform and quality standardisation can be justify if it is to develop an image for the brand 
and make it attractive.  
 
If the supplier has a market power under 30% it will not be considered to have any 
significant market power. If an undertaking with considering market power behaves in an 
anti-competitive manner it may concern things like price-fixing or market sharing.  
 
6.4 Vertical Regulation 
The 2010 Vertical Regulation142 is applicable on all vertical agreements including sales and 
purchasing of goods and service, retailer association’s vertical agreements and even vertical 
agreements concluded by competitors. IPRs are covered if the rights stand in relation to the 
marketing and sales of the products. The agreements covered by the regulation are exclusive 
distribution, franchising, purchasing- and selective distribution agreements.  
 
Article 3 of the regulation contains a 30% cap on what agreements the exemption does not 
apply to. The supplier or the buyer cannot exceed 30 % of the relevant market. The relevant 
product market is determined by the characteristics of the goods and how interchangeable 
they are.  In addition, you have to establish the relevant geographic market by determine in 
what area the undertakings act and where competition conditions are homogenous to 
distinguish an area.143 
 
6.4.1 Hard core provisions 
 
If an agreement contains any hard-core provision or they are engage by the parties the block 
exemption will not be applicable. Article 4 in the Regulation contains the black listed hard-
core restrictions.  
 
Resale Price maintenance (RPM) found in article 4(a) means the producers makes their 
parties sell their goods to a fixed price. This also includes minimum and maximum prices. 
Intra-brand competition can be disturbed and lead to uniformity in pricing by this kind of 
clauses. Indirect measures can also be caught by this provision.  
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According to 4(b) territorial restriction are seen with suspicion. What is included by this 
provision is appointed areas of responsibility, resale restrictions on territorial basis, the 
distributor’s location, restricting sales to unauthorized distributors in a specific territory and 
customer resale restrictions. An undertaking can therefore not limit territory’s or to what 
customers to sell the products to. It is also applicable on indirect territorial restriction for 
example refusing to supply and supplying a limited amount to a territory.  
 
Although parties participating in a selective distribution system can be prohibited to sell to 
unauthorized suppliers and buyers, who is using the goods for manufacturing a similar 
goods. Restricting passive sales are not permitted while active ones are.144  
 
Allowing passive sales means that a market cannot be isolated in whole. This is applicable 
on Internet sales where a customer contacts a distributor and even though the language fits 
the customer the distributor is still considered as passive in that sense. In the Pierre Fabre 
case145 the court established that cosmetics and personal care products cannot enjoy an 
absolute ban from Internet sales and that it infringes article 101(1) TFEU and can therefore 
not enjoy the protection from the 2010 vertical regulations.  
 
In article 5 the non-compete issue is concerned. This provision does not fall under the group 
exemption If the non-compete clause stands in conflict with article 101(1) the clause on 
itself will be considered to be void.146 Under the agreement the manufacturer can prohibit 
the buyer to produce, sell and purchase competing goods, although this provides that the 
duration is maximum 5 years.  
6.4.2 Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration means that an undertaking creates control at different levels in the 
production chain. A barrier to enter the market can constitute vertical integration. To be 
noted is that only intra-brand competition will be affected of vertical integration meaning 
only competition between retailers but on the same branded goods will suffer an affect. In 
other words competition between companies with similar products will not be hindered from 
competing on the same mark.147 This means that parallel importers and grey marketers will 
suffer from an undertaking using vertical integration to control the market.  
6.5 Agreements  
6.5.1 Commercial agency 
 
In the 2010 Vertical Guidelines an agency agreement are defined in point 12 as “An agent is 
a legal or physical person vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on 
behalf of another person (the principal), either in the agents own name or in the name of the 
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principal for the: purchase of goods or service by the principal or; sale of goods or services 
supplied by the principal”.  
 
The main different between distributors and agents is that the agent does not take any 
commercial risk and serves as an independent function for the operation. Theses type of 
relations escaped from the competition rules as confirmed in Consten and Grundig148.  Even 
though an agent agreement contained a non-compete clause it did not determined whether 
the agreement was infringing the competition rules.149 Gradually the attitude against agency 
agreements got stricter and in Eirpage150 the commission found a distribution network based 
on commercial agents as anti-competitive. However in this specific case they got exempted 
for 13 years due to consumer benefits.  
 
Crucial for determining if Article 101(1) applies is whether the agent bears any commercial 
or financial risk. There are two kinds of risks to be borne in mind. The first one is 
considering risk relating to market-specific investments and the other one risk connected to 
the commercial contracts.151 Clauses like territorial restrains, price fix etc., will escape the 
competition rules if the agent is working of behalf of the principal. The CJEU has 
established that an agent cannot an independent trader meaning that he bears no risk to 
escape the competition rules.152  
6.5.2 Exclusive distribution 
A distributor buys the goods and sells them in their own name. In other words, the opposite 
from an agent agreement the distributor works independently. The distributor buys the goods 
from the manufacturer at a price negotiated and then sells it to end consumer or to 
wholesalers or retailers at a price decided independently. The distributor is assigned with a 
specific territory, in which they exclusively sell the goods.  These types of agreements in 
itself are not considered as anti-competitive but there may be clauses which can have the 
effect of restricting competition.  
6.5.3 Consten & Grundig 
In Consten & Grundig153 the commission found an exclusive distribution agreement 
enhanced by a trademark and licensing and concluded the exclusiveness to be against the 
competition rules.  The CJEU then had to deal with question whether vertical agreements 
escaped the prohibition and how to deal with national IP rights.154 
 
First the CJEU took the stand that Article 101(1) TFEU was applicable to vertical 
distribution agreements as long it effects trade between member states and have the object or 
effect of distorting and preventing competition.  The second question that the court took a 
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stand in was the concept of “agreements… which may affect trade between member states”. 
Due to the prohibition that prevented other undertakings from importing the goods and 
preventing Consten to re-export the goods was enough to be considered affecting trade.  
 
As to if the agreement where restricting competition the CJEU stated that due to that the 
market was isolated and maintained artificially it was infringing article 101(1) TFEU.  In 
respect to the GINT-trademark, the parties claimed that the registration of the mark ensures 
territorial protection and it gives them the right to oppose parallel imports. The agreement 
authorizing Consten to register the trademark under their name seems to restrict competition. 
It therefore has a limiting effect that falls under the probation in 101(1). 
 
6.3.3 The distinction between open exclusive 
license and absolute territorial protection 
 
In Nungesser155 the question was whether an exclusive license could infringe article 101(1).  
INRA licensed out rights to produce and sell maize seeds to Nungesser under an absolute 
territorial protection. The court makes a distinction between “open exclusive license” and 
“absolute territorial protection”.156 The first scenario relates to the proprietor who promises 
to only grant one undertaking the license in a specific territory and not to compete with that 
licensee on that territory. An absolute territorial protection on the other hand is when the 
parties agree to eliminate all competition from any third parties with regard to the territory 
and goods in question. The conclusion by the CJEU is that “the grant of an open exclusive 
license, that is to say a license which does not affect the position of third parties such as 
parallel importers and licensees for other territories, is not in itself incompatible with article 
101(1) of the Treaty”.157  However where absolute territorial protection caught by the 
Article 101(1) and could not enjoy an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.158  
 
 
                                                
155 Case 258/78 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the European Communities. [1982] ECR 
2015 
156 Ibid., para 53 
157 Case 258/78 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the European Communities. [1982] ECR 
2015 para 58 
158 Ibid., para 61 & 73 
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7 Trademarks in the online forum 
7.1 Trademarks online 
 
With the development of modern technology a new marketplace for goods have emerged. 
Internet does not have any boundaries and in the light of the territorial IPRs, it has created 
new challenges for the commission and the EU courts. The law are being challenged by new 
technical developments and many companies are establishing themselves online. Because of 
these factors IP disputes on the Internet has grown. Trademark proprietors who want to 
establish a domain name may discover the name is already taken by another undertaking. 
Undertakings use other undertakings marks as keywords and in online advertising and the 
question arouse whether keywords can correspond to a trademark in the sense that the use of 
it may infringe a proprietors trademark rights? 
 
Online distribution is about the re-sale of goods and service online and this has created 
several new challenges under competition law and free movement of goods. As any kind of 
distribution, the Vertical Agreements Block Exemptions apply.  
 
In connection with the increased sales and marketing on Internet, a common 
misunderstanding is that a registration of a domain name or a company name provides with 
the same protection, as you would do a trademark registration. This is not the case due to 
that registration of domain name and company name does not protect your mark from other 
undertakings using an identical or similar mark as your brand.159 
 
7.2 Online distribution 
The basic notion is that distributors should have the possibility to sell and advertise their 
goods online. Restricting these kinds of Internet sales can only be justified in connection to 
active sales in exclusive territories or consumer group of other distributors. Although re-
sales on Internet are not in itself considered as a type of “active sales” as stated in paragraph 
51 of the vertical guidelines. As long as the website, do not target any special customer and 
remain accessible for everyone.  What language the website is has not been a determining 
factor in this matter. However if the webpage contains links or banners that will be 
considered as targeted for a consumer group in a specific consumer territory it can be 
measured as active sales. The same thing applies for e-mails that are targeted for a specific 
consumer group.160  
 
In connection to selective distribution, a supplier can require a certain quality standard for 
the re-sale, promotion and advertising of his goods, although the same quality standard must 
                                                
159 Kolah A, Essential Law for Marketers. Second edition. Taylor and Francis. 2013 
160 Dean J M, International Distribution Overview of Relevant Distribution laws: Review of 2011 and outlook 
for 2012. [2012] Journal of European Competition Law and Practice Advance. 
Available at: http://www.vogel-vogel.com/sites/vogel-vogel/files/Article.pdf accessed 20 Mars 2013 
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apply to both physical shops as to those online.161 If it is objectively justified, there is a 
possibility to prohibit Internet sales.162 Examples for what can be considered as objective 
criteria in the context of quality like point of sale service, sales staffs training and what 
range of products being sold. There must be a commercial justification of the selective 
distribution.  In Yves Saint Laurent163 the ban on mail-order re-sale in their selective 
distribution where justified because those luxury products should be presented in a 
homogenous way. This decision was upheld by the CFI.164 Nevertheless, due to the adoption 
of the Block Exemptions and the Vertical Guidelines the decision where renewed and the 
commission concluded that a total prohibition of re-sales online where not tolerable and 
therefore YSL had to give their selected retailers the right to commit online sales as well.165 
7.2.1 Pierre Fabre 
In Pierre Fabre166 the court dealt with the question whether an absolute ban of Internet sales 
could constitute an infringement of article 101(1) TFEU. The court of appeal referred this 
question to the CJEU: “Does a general and absolute ban on selling contract goods to end-
users on the Internet, imposed on authorised distributors in the context of a selective 
distribution network, in fact constitute a “hardcore” restriction of competition by object for 
the purpose of article 81(1) EC (now 101(1) TFEU) which is not covered by the block 
exemptions provided for by Regulation No 2790/1999 but which is potentially eligible for an 
individual exemption under Article 81(3) EC (now 101(3) TFEU)?” 
 
The clause in question in Pierre Fabre’s selective distribution agreement stated that the 
resale of their products must be made in a physical space with a qualified pharmacist 
present. Arguments about keeping a prestigious image and give individual advice for 
costumers were not justifications enough to restrict competition. The court stated that this 
clause had the intention and the object to restrict all online passive sales because they were 
de facto excluded by this provision and could therefore not enjoy the block exemptions. 
However it was also established that an individual exemption under article 101(3) where 
possible in this matter although it was limited to exceptional circumstances.  
 
The Pierre Fabre case confirmed the commission’s strict approach against restricting 
Internet re-sale. However, instead of just making a decision with rationale from competition 
law it was more based on a free movement of goods way of thinking when using words like 
“proportionality”, “object justifications” or “necessity”.167 Therefore, the judgement lacks of 
a competition law analyse.  
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7.2.2 Justifications for banning Internet sales 
Although the Pierre Fabre case168 was harsh in the context for banning Internet sales the 
CJEU has left it open for two possible justifications. The first justification is relating to a 
specific product and the special nature of it and the second justification is the possibility for 
an individual exemption.  
 
The first possible justification relates to mandatory European or national regulations that has 
the objectives to protect the consumer’s safety and health or for public order reasons. The 
Advocate General Mazák’s view is that the exceptional circumstances can also include 
voluntary measures limiting the re-sale of goods online in the light of the nature of the goods 
and the customer forum they are sold in. However, he also considers the arguments laid 
down by Pierre Fabre to be insufficient.169 These objective justifications have a narrow 
application and for that the justifications can only applicable in exceptional circumstances 
according to the commission. Due to the court’s reasoning under the free movement of 
goods instead of the competition rules the justification on maintain a prestigious image do 
not have a chance of being acceptable as a legitimate justification.  
 
The other possible justification is the individual exemption under article 101(3) TFEU due 
to the exclusion of the vertical block exemption. This means that all the four conditions of 
the article must be fulfilled to be applicable as an exemption. However did the CJEU choose 
not to make this assessment because of insufficient information but it seems unlikely that a 
prohibition of Internet sales would fall under such exemption.  
7.2.3 Conditions to online selling 
Some conditions on online sales have been accepted and some have been contested by the 
European Courts and the authorities. Those conditions that have generally been accepted are 
conditions relating to quality standards, equal conditions for online and offline sales, brick 
and mortar outlets and demanding minimum turnover in the brick and mortal shops. The 
quality standards usually are a big part of a selective distribution agreement and therefore its 
accepted as a way to uphold a brand image.170 The conditions set on the distributors must 
however be equally applied on both those who use online sales as to those that have physical 
stores.171 The vertical guidelines allows the supplier to “require that its distributors have 
one or more brick and mortar shops or showrooms as a condition for becoming a member of 
its distribution system”172 to avoid free riders. The supplier can demand a minimum 
turnover in value or volume in brick and mortar shops just so they can avoid fictive shops.173  
 
Some conditions have however been disputed like percentages of sales being effected online 
or offline, dual pricing and prohibition of sales at sales-platforms online. First mentioned 
condition concerning percentage of sales being maximum affected online or minimum 
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affection offline has been considered as a hard-core restriction.174 Dual pricing for offline 
and online resale is also a hard-core restriction due to the Vertical guidelines; this also 
includes indirect pricing when discounts can apply.175 A current discussion is restriction of 
resale at market platforms like Amazon or eBay, although quality standards may be imposed 
to the use of such platforms.176  The approach against the resale of goods on a third party 
platform varies in the national markets.177  
7.3 Keyword advertising 
There are several decisions from the CJEU that answers the questions around keyword 
advertising and how the Directive and Regulation should be interpreted in the light of 
keyword issues like search engines, advertising and trademark proprietors rights. It has been 
established by the CJEU in the Google France-case178 that the use of keywords on Internet 
constitutes a use of a trademark. It can therefore constitute a trademark infringement if a 
normal consumer cannot identify the origin of the goods and this is what the court examined 
in this case.179 
 
Keyword advertising is about advertising in search engines. When a Internet user types in a 
word in the search engine it will get up two results: The first one is the natural objective 
results and the second type is the sponsored ads that will appear right next to the natural 
ones. The sponsored results are ads bought by companies to make their page appear as a 
relevant result in connection to the keywords they have selected. These chosen keywords 
can correspond to trademarks and therefore it has raised concerns among many trademark 
proprietors in the use of these keywords and how they are exploited.  
 
Relevant provisions in this matter are the Article 5 of the Directive180 and the Article 9 of 
the Regulation181 because they prevent any double identity meaning that they give the 
proprietor the right to prevent the use of identical or similar trademarks. There has to be a 
likelihood of confusion between the trademarks. However, the CJEU has stated that in order 
to let the proprietors apply these provisions the third party use must somehow affect the 
functions of the trademark.182 The E-Commerce Directive183  and especially Article 14 has 
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also been a part of the Court’s reasoning in these types of cases due to that it exempts 
service providers like Google from liability because of their inactive role. 184 
7.3.1 Google France and Bergspechte 
It was first established that Internet service providers like Google only stores keywords 
identical or similar to a trademark and does not make use of the trademark within the 
meaning of the Article 5(1) the directive and the Article 9(1) of the Regulation.185 
 
In the second part of the Court’s reasoning, they concluded that the same provisions must 
have the meaning that trademark proprietors can be able to prohibit advertisers from using a 
keyword that is similar or identical to their mark depending of what effects the advertising 
has. A trademark proprietor may prevent the use of their mark as a keyword in situations 
where an average Internet user cannot determine whether the trademark proprietor and the 
advertiser are economically linked.186 However, this statement also concludes that when a 
Internet user actually can distinguish between the proprietor of the mark and the third party 
using it as a keyword there was no infringement of the trademark and the proprietor cannot 
prohibit such use.  
 
7.3.2 Using a trademark as keyword 
The CJEU has made their conclusions in the notion of whether using a keyword constitute a 
use within the meaning of the relevant provisions. Their reasoning can be divided into two 
parts: First of all if it is use in the course of trade and second the use is “in relation to goods 
or services which are identical with or similar to, those for witch that trademark is 
registered.”187 
 
The Court made the important distinction between search engines and advertisers and their 
responsibilities. The search engines do not make use of the trademark and can therefore not 
be caught by the relevant provisions due to that they do not use them for any commercial 
communication.188 When it comes to the advertisers on the other hand their use of keywords 
identical to trademarks do constitute use within the meaning of the articles. It is about 
whether the keywords create any likelihood of confusion and fall under the double identity 
provisions. However, it was stated that this conclusion must be made the respective national 
courts. They must look at the essential function of the trademark by assessing whether a 
“normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users, or enables them only with 
difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate from the 
proprietor of the trademark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the 
contrary, originate from a third party.”189 But this only applies in respect to the advertiser 
and not the online service provider.190 However this also means that because it is up to the 
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national courts to do the assessment on a case-to-case basis the result will probably vary and 
can led to inharmonious on this matter.  
7.3.3 The use of trademarks on online marketplaces 
Online marketplaces and online auction sites are a new type of trade where online shopping 
takes place. The increasing business online depend a lot on the fact that there is no 
geographical barriers in comparison to the classic trade. The definition of online shopping is 
when the consumers can buy goods and service directly through the Internet by placing an 
order. The online marketplaces such as eBay allow traders to sell goods to customers by 
setting up an account and letting them bid on the product. However may these online 
marketplaces raise concerns from trademark proprietor’s perspective.191 EBay is also 
advertising online by using keywords that relates to trademarks to attract customers to their 
site.192 To be noted is that eBay does not sell or store the goods sold on the site but it merely 
connects sellers and purchasers. Issues with this service from a trademark perspective can be 
the resale of counterfeit goods, unpacked goods but also parallel imports by the resale of 
goods intended for a third country market. EBay has however taken steps to secure that 
trademark infringement are not committed trough their site by for example the standard 
agreement that states that the resale of counterfeit goods and any trademark infringement is 
not allowed.193 In the American Tiffany v eBay ruling194the US Court of Appeals stated that 
eBay’s use of the Tiffany trademark was lawful due to that it was used to promote genuine 
goods. It was also affirmed that eBay does not have liability for any trademark infringement.  
 
When it comes to unpacked goods sold on eBay but also the exhaustion of rights conferred 
by a trademark the CJEU examined this in the Boehringer Ingelheim ruling.195 As stated in 
previous chapter the exhaustion principle exhaust the trademark proprietors right as soon as 
the goods are put on the market inside the community by themselves or with their consent. 
However, the exception is when the trademark proprietor has legitimate reasons for 
opposing further commercialisation of the goods. The case concerned medical products that 
had been re-boxed and re-labelled and the Court stated that they could oppose the resale of 
the goods if the parallel importer was liable of damaging the trademarks reputation. It was 
however stated that when the packaging was not relevant for the reputation of the goods this 
would be irrelevant however when it comes to medical and cosmetic products the packaging 
contains valuable information.  
 
When parallel imports are resold on a auction site like this the issue is quite clear. If the 
goods have not been put on the Community market before this will constitute an 
infringement of the proprietor’s trademark rights. This has been confirmed in various rulings 
by the CJEU.196 However, the issue is far more complex due to that online marketplaces can 
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be reached from the whole world including from the community. How can the Court 
determine if the goods are intended for the European market?   
 
In the L'Oréal v eBay case197 it was established that traders that offered goods that have not 
been put on the EEA market before would be held liable for infringing the trademark. The 
CJEU left it for the national court to decide: “It thereforee falls to the national courts to 
assess on a case by case basis whether there are any relevant factors on the basis of 
which it may be concluded that an offer for sale, displayed on an online marketplace 
accessible from the territory covered by the trade mark, is targeted at consumers in 
that territory.”198 However this will not lead to any homogenous treatment of these types 
of cases.  
 
In Silberquelle199 it was reaffirmed that promotional products that are supplied free of 
charge will not be regarded as being put on the market by the trademark owner within the 
meaning of the Trade Mark Directive 89/104 and the Regulation 40/94. 
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8 Analysis 
8.1 Trademark 
 
A proprietor of a trademark will invest a lot of time and money in building up a trademark 
that distinguish their brand from other companies on the market. However it is important 
that the proprietor’s rights do not extend to the point that it closes out competition that can 
be healthy for the market and the consumers. Trademark rights are territorial and exclusive 
rights that may divide the market. To have in mind when looking at this issue is that the 
trademark directive and the rules on competition and free movement of goods rules have the 
same goal and that is to eliminate negative effects on free movement of goods and 
restrictions on free competition the difference is that they come from different stand points. 
Parallel trade and the trademark different functions are closely connected and it is important 
for a trademark proprietor to protect their trademarks different functions. However you 
cannot say that parallel importers and grey marketers infringes trademark rights in a 
classical sense due to that the goods that these deal with are genuine but they can be adapted 
to another market then the one that the parallel importers sell them in.  
It is common that manufacturers adjust their goods to the market it is intended to be sold in. 
This can be problematic when an unauthorized dealer decides to sell the goods to another 
market with different standards. The issue lies in the way this type of trade works and affects 
the trademarks functions. The reputation of a mark can be tarnished when the goods under a 
trademark do not live up the expectations of the consumer but it can also gain advantages by 
being more exploited to the public.  
 
Trademarks are nationally bound rights and therefor the protection of them can differ. 
Although the trademark directive have harmonized theses rights to a large extent the CJEU 
often leaves the interpretation of details to the national courts creating unharmonized 
application. Article 5 of the directive that safeguards the proprietors exclusive rights to the 
mark can be limited by the exhaustion principle.  
8.2  Exhaustion 
 
The European Union’s goal to create a common market, without any trade barriers between 
the member states, has come a long way although some barriers still remain. The Silhouette 
ruling is a landmark case that set the standard for the European approach on parallel imports 
and recent case law has developed this approach even further. This principle safeguards that 
there will not be any distortion on free movement on goods inside the EEA market. The 
ruling also created a link between trademark laws and trade in general. You can however 
discuss the fairness of setting developing countries at a disadvantage by banning parallel 
imports. Before this ruling it was still possible for the national authorities to decide whether 
they would introduce international exhaustion. This judgment however changes the 
standards by establishing regional exhaustion through the Union. They considered that the 
trademark owners should have the right to be the first one to put the goods on the market. 
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You cannot put restrains on the sole existence of a trademark right but you can influence 
how the rights should be exercised.  
 
However, you could argue that there would have been barriers to trade inside the community 
if it was up to the member states themselves to decide which exhaustion principle they 
wanted to apply. On the other side, international exhaustion could promote price 
competition and therefore be advantageous for the consumer. By not allowing international 
exhaustion it may seem like the union are being kind of protectionist by restricting inter-
brand trade. Although, the court did not take some policy issues into consideration in this 
important ruling that can be relevant in the context. The CJEU could have considered the 
impact on free trade and competition law.   
 
When it comes to the criterion that must be satisfied for the exhaustion principle to apply the 
court seems to have difficulties in how to interpret them and especially the consent criteria. 
First the CJEU took the approach that the common origin is the deciding factor when 
determine whether a proprietor has given their consent in situation where it is a matter of a 
relationship between the proprietor and the one importing the goods. Although the Court 
changed their opinion in this matter but they still seem confused in how to interpret this 
criterion. The putting on the market criteria is clearer and the interpretation has not changed 
in any significant way meaning trademark owners have the exclusive right to put the goods 
on the market first. This can however be limited in connection to the transit of the goods, 
which makes sense because they do not have the intention to commercialize them.  
 
When it comes to repackaging obviously this can affect a trademark in a concerning matter. 
The case law on repackaging has focused on the functions of a trademark and how they are 
affected by repacking the goods. Especially the original function is at stake. Compared to 
straight up exhaustion cases in the case law on repackaging the court do not look at the 
consent criteria from the proprietor in any relevant matter. However, the CJEU has 
established that the repackaging must be necessary for the commercialisation of the goods.  
 
The determine factor in all parallel importation cases is that the original function of a 
trademark cannot be affected in a way meaning that consumers will get the wrong 
impression that the parallel importer is the rightful owner of the mark. Unauthorized dealers 
may advertise without the proprietors consent unless there is some serious damage done to 
the reputation of the mark. If the advertising is costume for those specific products the 
proprietor will have a hard time to oppose that type of commercialisation, emphasizing that 
trademarks functions are worthy to protect.   
 
8.3 Parallel trade 
8.3.1 Positive and negative effects of parallel trade 
 
An unauthorized dealer sells goods without the proprietors consent. It is not unlawful in the 
classical sense like black market goods due to that the goods are genuine but not 
manufactured for that specific market. The trademarks reputation may be affected if the 
goods are different in for example quality or taste then the consumers is normally used to, 
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although there might only be a difference in price. The approach taken by many scholars is 
that giving the trademark proprietors the right to prohibit parallel imports would create 
exclusive territories that negatively affecting the market and competition. But as stated 
parallel trade could be both negative and positive for the market including the proprietor and 
the consumers. Negative effects for the proprietor can be that the parallel traders and grey 
marketer’s effect the marks reputation and the original function of the mark. The consumer 
can be misled on who the rightful owner of the trademark is and the expectations on a 
certain mark may be destroyed and leading to that the proprietor can be losing consumers. 
The companies have been able to carry out price discrimination but parallel trade makes this 
hard, although to have in mind is that price discrimination can be bad where the price are 
cheaper for the same goods on a different market but it can also be good due to that they are 
cheaper on that specific market. Meaning that allowing parallel trade can actually raise 
prices in some markets. Although, generally the prices would be under a higher pressure and 
be kept low.  
 
There is also the issue with free riding and if it is fair for the proprietor that has spent a lot of 
time and money to build a strong brand. Do they have to let other benefit from their efforts? 
I would say yes because there are some simple solutions to this issue. The positive effects 
are mostly reserved for the general competition climate on the market and the consumers. It 
puts pressure on the companies to develop and keep lower prices. The consumers are offered 
a wide range of different products to lower prices. Small actors are given a chance to 
compete with the big boys. The proprietors can also be gaining on this type of trade by 
letting the trademark have maximum exposure to the public. Arbitrage creates an excellent 
opportunity for parallel traders and price discrimination between the different European 
markets gets harder to commit it this type of environment. To sum this up: to give the 
trademark proprietors the chance to divide the market and manipulate it seems to be 
negative not only for pricing but also for the range of products.  
 
The common sales law is just another step for simplifying cross-border trade. It will 
harmonize contractual regulations and nourish parallel trade inside the union by making it 
easier to carry out trade across the borders. However this will only apply to European affairs 
or at least when one of the parties are based in the union, meaning trade barriers inside the 
EEA market will be reduced. What effects it will have on international trade is yet unclear.  
The regulation has been evaluated to reduce a lot of additional cost in making cross-border 
sales. The will to engage in cross-border trade has been high but are hindered by practical 
barriers relating to contractual problems. Obviously, this is bad both for the companies 
wanting to reach more customers but also for the consumers who miss out of better offers or 
products.200 
8.3.2 Can parallel trade be seen as unfair competition? 
 
Fair competition has been defined as companies endorsing their market shares under fair 
conditions. Can parallel trade affect the market in such a way leading to unfair competition? 
                                                
200COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Executive summary of the Impact Assessment. Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law 
on a Common European Sales Law. Brussels, 11.10.2011 SEC(2011) 1166 final Available 
at:http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/1_resume_impact_assesment_en.pdf 
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As established a grey marketer can free ride on a trademark proprietors market activities. 
Can the trademark proprietors restrain the parallel importers free riding or is there any other 
solution? If parallel importers sell trademark-protected goods with the same quality as the 
authorized distribution channels, the distributors with authorization do not have a monopoly 
of those goods on the market. Then the competition will only be on the price level. The 
profits of the authorized channel will however be reduced and this was the argument in the 
Silhouette-case. Another way to see it is that the trademark proprietor could expand their 
market share by letting the distributors compete on a price level instead.  
 
As stated before some companies modify their products depending on what market they are 
being sold at. Usually this is done to adapt to the consumers on that specific market. This 
also has the consequence that product quality may differ and the unauthorized channels may 
sell goods with poorer quality to a market where better quality products are sold under the 
same trademark. Fair trade should however not be affected if the unauthorized distributors 
label the goods so the consumer know where they originates from. 
 
Consumers do not have to be familiar to the parallel imported products and it may what to 
buy from already established distributors on that specific market and therefore the 
authorized distributor may still have a competitive advantage over the unauthorized one. But 
the authorized channels heavy investments in sales and advertising is done to establish their 
position on that market. Parallel importers usually do not pay for any advertising on their 
own but gain from the effects that mean that unfair competition currently does exist.  
There are two solutions to the free riding issue. One is that the manufacturer pays for all 
advertising meaning the type and content of it and in fact this is done by many on a 
international level. Another would be to make grey marketers to actually pay their own 
advertising costs or at least share them with the proprietor.  
 
8.4 Free movement of goods 
 
The Free movement of goods Articles 34-36 establish a general prohibition that covers both 
import and export barriers like prior authorization, price controls, and measures having 
equivalent effects like requiring certain types of labelling and advertising of goods, origin 
and quality marks, language requirements and restrictions on distance selling. The rules also 
applies when authorities are inactive and letting barriers emerge without taking action 
having the practical meaning that a single companies act can be a problem for the state 
authorities when it comes to restricting trade and the creation of barriers to enter the market 
because the state will be liable. The aim is to create free circulation of goods across the 
union, the member states is obligated to remove trade barriers and the rules can be relied on 
by the courts.  
 
The state cannot require goods to have origin and quality marks due to that it would promote 
the domestic goods. Language requirements can only be justified when consumers needs to 
have sufficient information about the goods. This is dependent of what type of products are 
concerned and the general knowledge about the language. For example medical products 
need to have clear labels because of consumers health concerns. Also you might presume the 
English language is known by a great part of the union and that you cannot require to change 
it to the domestic language.  
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Banning Internet sales have been considered as a selling arrangement having the meaning 
that the question is if prohibiting online sales can be seen as discriminatory. The CJEU took 
the view that that it is especially important for new brands to be able to use the online forum 
to access a new market. However, the court says nothing about if this applies to parallel 
traders and grey marketers. They have focused on new products and how new companies 
must be able to establish themselves on new markets. When it comes to parallel traders the 
products are not new but the distributors might be at least not on the European market but it 
could be new for that specific domestic market due to that regional exhaustion applies. The 
question could be what rights the unauthorized distributors should have in this matter. 
 
Article 36 trademark works as a legitimate justification for restrictions on trade. However 
they cannot use this provision with an economical approach and it must be seen under the 
light of the proportionality principle. The justifications cannot lead to discrimination and the 
proprietors cannot oppose the imports of goods already put on the EEA market. The problem 
with unauthorized goods is that you could claim that the proprietors do not gain on it in any 
way more than the exposition of the mark. Otherwise the positive effects of parallel imports 
usually apply to the market and the consumers because it could lead to better prices and a 
wider range of products.  
 
The mandatory requirements fall under an own list of justifications. It is however from my 
point of view peculiar that Article 36 does not contain any of these further justifications like 
these mandatory requirements; they are still dependent on the notion of non-discrimination 
and proportionality. Meaning a member state cannot ban a product that is manufactured by 
domestic companies due to that it would qualify as discrimination.  
 
8.5 Competition law 
8.5.1 The competition law perspective on trademarks 
Trademarks are not anti-competitive by their very nature but they do have characteristics 
that by their first look seems to go against the goals of free competition. From a supremacy 
point of view, competition law will have priority over the national intellectual property 
rights. Trademarks cannot be dangerous from a competition law perspective by their mare 
existence; it is when they are used for anti-competitive aims like in a licensing-agreement 
that can they close up the market. When trademarks are used to make an artificial dividing 
of the market and works as a barrier for market entry that you can consider it as an anti-
competitive issue. The free movement of goods and competition law provisions complement 
each other. An action can escape the free movement of goods provisions but still be caught 
by the competition law provisions but this also applies the other way around.  
 
Article 101(1) TFEU has the function of catching agreements, no matter of what form they 
have, which restricts competition on the market. Vertical relationships between 
manufacturer and distributors can be caught under this provision if there is a union 
dimension and if it direct or indirectly affects trade between member states. The de minimis 
doctrine is also relevant in the context of article 101(1) due to that an agreement must have a 
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certain degree of market share on the relevant market, otherwise would small agreements 
with no noticeable affects be caught.  
 
8.5.2 Distribution in a competition law perspective 
 
Distribution agreements are vertical relationships and they are usually exempted under the 
competition rules because they rarely give raise to anti-competitive behaviour. Although 
these types of agreements are not entirely exempted from the competition rules and this 
especially applies to exclusive co-operations. Typically prohibiting parallel trade inside the 
union is seen with harsh eyes from the courts and authorities. Although some vertical 
restrains may be justified, like the one scenario when trying to avoid free riders. Also 
territorial protection can be justified in connection to first time investments for establishing a 
trademark on a new market.  
 
Trademarks are covered by the Vertical regulation in relation to marketing and sales of 
goods. Resale Price Maintenance can be disturbing for intra-brand competition meaning the 
prices for similar goods remain on the same level and no competition pressure arises giving 
consumers less beneficial prices. Territorial restrictions are usually seen as anti-competitive 
behaviour because they dived the market. This also has the practical meaning that there 
cannot be any restrictions on passive sales to unauthorized distributors in a specific territory 
although active ones may be restricted. Passive sales may be especially important in 
connection to Internet-sales where the consumer approach a seller straight trough the web 
page. An absolute ban on sales through Internet has been caught by Article 101(1) by the 
CJEU and will not be exempted under the Vertical Regulation.  
 
When using an exclusive distribution system the manufacturer and the proprietor must be 
more careful to decide what terms they use in the agreement. The reason is that some clauses 
will be seen as anti-competitive in a exclusive relationship. The CJEU established that the 
competition rules are applicable on vertical agreements; the determining factor is whether a 
competition is distorted or prevented. Trademarks cannot be used for dividing the market 
and prohibiting parallel trade because they would be caught by Article 101(1).  
 
There is a distinction between an open exclusive license agreement and an agreement with 
an absolute territorial protection. The reason the court made the distinction is that third 
parties would be affected of an absolute territorial license and there will be restrains on 
competition, while an open exclusive license can be beneficial for competition. The 
conclusion to draw from the distinction between those two is that under an exclusive 
relationship the parties cannot use clauses that have the effect of shutting out all competitors 
like restricting parallel trade. You can also draw the conclusion that parallel trade can be 
healthy for competition in general because it puts pressure on companies to meet consumer 
demands and keep the best prices available.  
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8.6 The use of trademarks online 
8.6.1 Trademark rights online 
Internet trade has a great impact on the world economy and therefore trademark rights and 
advertising online is a hot topic inside the European Union. It is for the national courts to 
apply the relevant provisions in the Directive and the Regulation by using the framework 
that the CJEU has developed by the rulings in Google France and Bergspechte. Although 
the national courts still has a lot of freedom in deciding in these types of cases. The impact 
of future case law on the keywords relating to trademarks will be of great value in the eyes 
on the proprietors and the advertisers. The main reasons is that territorial restrains cannot be 
upheld due to that web pages can be reached from all over the world and are easy accessible. 
The question raised is how territorial bound trademark rights are applied in this context. 
Mainly online distribution and keyword advertising has been an issue in the light of 
trademark rights.   
 
As stated in free movement of goods cases Internet sales are of a big importance for 
companies trying to establish themselves on a new market. It is cheaper then to set up an 
actual store and they can reach consumers all around the world. Meaning that companies 
trying to restrict sales online restrict the possibility for some companies to be successful. 
Trademark rights are valuable assets but it should not include the restriction of online sales 
unless there are legitimate justifications.  
 
The main rule is that passive sales like online sales cannot be prohibited as long as they do 
not target any specific consumer group. There could however be some justifications on 
restricting online re-sale like quality standards. The court has considered the nature of 
different marketplaces. However, I do not see how you can demand the same high standards 
on a online web shop like you do on a psychical sales point. Online stores are limited in how 
to present the products and the trademarks while in real life stores there are details like 
window-display etc. I see it hard to compare quality standards when the way to do business 
is so entirely different. Nevertheless, this has not been a part of any assessment from the 
courts. There are however some limited conditions to online sales that has been accepted by 
the court, as long as they are applied equally to online resale as to physical shops, but they 
are limited to quality standards and brick and mortar outlets and minimum turnover 
conditions.  
 
The issue with distribution in an online forum has not yet found a balance but its aiming 
towards an efficient law. In addition, the court seems to have a hard time with the economic 
analysis of the vertical restrictions when they took a more formal and traditional approach to 
the restriction and disregarded the practical effects of it. The new approach in the block 
exemptions and guidelines has a focused more on the effects of the restriction with an 
empiric and economical-view, opposite to this traditional approach taken by the court. There 
is also a political side of this matter where both the commission and the CJEU want to 
promote this new trading method and the creation of an internal market without depending 
on treaties.  
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8.6.2 The courts approach in Pierre Fabre 
 
The Pierre Fabre case illustrates the connection between trademark rights, competition law 
and free movement of goods.  Taking a traditional approach and an economical-based one 
will lead to different evaluation by the court as discussed in the article about the 
consequences of the Pierre Fabre judgement on distribution online by Louis Vogel.201 The 
traditional approach takes a more hands on method by just establishing whether the 
restriction is prohibited and the economical aspect will not be a part of their reasoning. If on 
the other hand an economical analyse is made it will penetrate deeper but with the cost of 
legal certainty.202 
 
Vogel takes the view that if the court did an economical analyse of the vertical restriction 
the outcome would probably would have been different. The two main arguments are the 
efficiency that these types of distribution system create but also that this was a good way to 
avoid free riders.203  
 
This judgment has been highly criticized because of the short motivation and the nature of 
the CJEU’s reasoning. Vogel believes the judgement has some weaknesses and that the 
CJEU should not have reflected on the ban of Internet sales as a restriction by object and 
that this principle does not meet the traditional object approach. He considers that 
prohibiting Internet sales creates positive effects on competition and is opposite to the other 
hard-core restrictions, as market sharing or price fixing, which will be presumed to have a 
negative impact on competition. Vogel is also criticizing the fact that the court only 
established the clause was disproportionate because it de facto banned Internet sales when 
stating that they would take the objectives and the economic and legal context of the 
clause.204 The fact in this case was that there was a strong level of both inter-brand and intra-
brand competition but this was not a part of the courts analyse at all.205  
 
Although the Pierre Fabre case gave some guidelines in how the issue with restricting re-
sale online will be seen by the court. It seems like it is hard to impose an absolute ban on 
resale online to authorized distributors, unless there is some legit justifications, keeping a 
prestigious image was not enough. Justifying a complete ban online seems to be limited but 
the authorities has left a small window open by mentioning their might be justifications due 
to exceptional circumstances or under the individual exemptions under Article 101(3). 
Although has “exceptional circumstances” not really been defined in connection to online 
resale, so what the court will actually consider as a justification will be interesting to see.  
 
 
 
                                                
201 Vogel, L. EU Competition Law Applicable to distribution agreements: Review of 2011 and Outlook for 
2012. Published April 19 2012. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice Advance Access 
202 Ibid page 2 
203 Ibid 
204 Ibid page 3 
205 Ibid Page 4 
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8.6.3 Keyword advertising 
 
Can trademark really be used in the classical way in the online environment? This question 
has been considered several times in front of the CJEU. There is different interest to 
consider when it connection to keyword advertising. You have the trademark proprietors 
right to protection of their trademark, the consumers right to not be mislead but also free 
competition on the market. There is no specific regulation on keyword advertising the courts 
have therefore been doing an extensive interpretation of the trademark directive and 
regulation and other related provisions on the issue. In mentioned case law the issue was 
about using another proprietors trademark as a keyword on advertising online at a service 
provider without any consent from the proprietor. The CJEU has considered whether this 
action is infringing the proprietor’s rights and if a service provider like Google has any 
responsibility. It is the double identity provision that get relevant in connection to keyword 
advertising. The trademarks different function is considered and if the original function 
could be damage and the use of a trademark as a keyword must clearly be identified by a 
normally informed consumer.  
 
In the Google France-case Google was not considered to have responsibility for the 
trademark infringement because they functioned as a third party provider without using the 
trademark in the sense that I would be caught under the relevant trademark provisions. The 
advertiser the use a trademark as a keyword could however be hold responsible for 
disturbing any of the trademarks functions. Meaning trademarks can also function as a 
legitimate barrier to trade online. 
 
8.6.4 Speculative consequences from keyword advertising 
 
However there could be positive consequences for a proprietor when third parties use their 
trademark in online advertising like keyword advertising. One thing can be an enhancement 
of goodwill for the mark because of the exposure. From a consumer perspective keyword 
advertising also can be beneficial because it makes it easier for them to find a specific brand, 
but also to compare prices between different dealers. Another positive effect from this type 
of advertising is that could open up the market for smaller companies if they can associate 
themselves with the big players. Internet opens up opportunities without spending a lot of 
money.  
 
There could be some negative effects from keyword advertising to, like the issue with free 
riding and trademark infringement. In the long-term, a trademark can lose their reputation 
and get weaker because of the exposure. The consumer and proprietor can be negatively 
affected and competition may be distorted.  
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9 Conclusion 
Trademark protection can be used as a barrier against competitors, by mainly securing the 
right to exclusively use and prevent competitors from using a confusingly similar mark to 
lend acceptance or value to their products or services. By doing so, the trademark protection 
barrier preserves the owner's reputation and recognition for quality and reliability on the 
market, probably developed over time through promotional effort, expenses and innovation. 
 
Trademark rights can serve as a legitimate reason for opposing free movement of goods, in 
the sense of parallel trade and this may be a problem under the free movement of goods 
rules as from a competition law perspective. On one hand there is the trademark proprietors 
right to use their mark and prevent double identity marks and infringements of it, on the 
other hand it cannot be used to restrict free movement of goods and distortion of 
competition. The relationship in-between these are complex. The distinction between the 
existence and exercise of a mark means that you cannot put restrains on the sole existence of 
a trademark right but you can influence how the rights should be exercised. It has been 
established that the trademarks different function are worthy protection, especially the 
original function have been highlighted by the CJEU in almost every parallel trade case. 
Although the legal provisions can constitute barriers to entry they cannot be inevitably 
barriers due to that the trademark right covers a specific brands products and do not prevent 
the manufacturing and sales of similar products under a different trademark. Trademarks 
create barrier for market entry but the problem lies in when the proprietors use them to form 
a strategic behaviour that distorts competition.  
 
The regional exhaustion principle has been presented in the community as a solution for 
restricting the use of trademark rights to oppose further commercialisation of the goods, 
including parallel trade inside the Community between the member states. The relevant 
consent-criterion and the putting on the market-criterion has to be fulfilled for the 
exhaustion to be recognized, mainly to safeguard that the rights of the proprietor does not 
get exhausted by a third parties market behaviour. The provisions that safeguards free 
movement of goods are operating to take away barriers of trade and function in a 
complementary way but can stand in conflict with the territorial rights that IP creates. The 
exhaustion principle was instituted to create a balance and limit the right oppose the use of 
their trademark to among other things ban parallel imports. Further commercialization of 
goods can only be opposed when having some kind a justification that the court has 
accepted. 
	  
Intra-brand competition creates some serious conflicts between the trademark proprietors 
and the unauthorized players. Proprietors have argued that parallel trade and grey marketing 
can harm their mark, which is true to some extent. The reputation and origin function of the 
mark can suffer from this type of trade and can in some situation be legitimate justifications 
for opposing parallel trade. Parallel trade can have both positive and negative effects for the 
actors on the market. The negative effects mostly affects the trademark proprietors due to 
that their marks reputation and original function can be denigrated but they may also be 
affected be parallel importers and grey marketers free riding on their advertising and efforts 
to build a strong brand on the market. However, there are many factors that points to many 
positive effects of parallel trade and grey marketing, as exploitation of the mark, lower 
prices, wider range of products, good climate for intra-brand and inter-brand competition 
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and social welfare. Small actors can have a chance to compete with already established 
market actors. Even though the free riding issue still remains, there are better solutions, then 
to prohibit parallel trade. The negative effects of parallel trade can be solved by simple 
means therefore the conclusion drawn from this examination is that parallel trade in general 
are good for the market, consumers and competition among the different actors on the 
market. So therefore the parallel traders and grey marketers use of trademarks cannot be 
seen contrary to trademark rights.  
 	  
If banning parallel trade from grey markets it could lead to a monopoly situation.  The 
negative effect from a competition view is trademark proprietors prohibiting parallel imports 
could lead to exclusionary results and be used to prevent any price pressure and therefore 
creating trade barriers. Competition law and the free movement of goods provisions 
complete each other by covering different scenarios of barrier of trade. This means that these 
regulations will frame trademark rights and protect competition from not getting distorted. 
Under the competition rules active sales may be restricted but a restriction on passive sale 
can be seen as anti-competitive.  
 
When it comes to trademarks in the online forum the same rules applies as to the use of 
trademarks offline. The only difference is that service providers like Google and online 
marketplaces like eBay do not have to be hold responsible for the infringements conducted 
in their service. The exhaustion principle applies to goods sold online and the notion of 
consent and putting on the market criterion will be considered to determine if the proprietor 
of the mark can oppose the commercialization of their goods online, although it has to be 
determined on a case-to-case basis due to that the sites can be reached globally.  
 
Keywords that correspond to trademarks are considered to be used online in the classical 
sense if it is a question about an advertiser using it for online advertising, having the 
practical meaning that the proprietors can oppose the use depending on the effects of the 
advertising and especially to prevent any double identity. The trademark rights can rarely be 
used to restrict online sales due to that it is seen as passive sales, this seams only be possible 
in situations where it is connected to active sales in exclusive territories and when there is a 
justification or a individual exemption for the ban. The ground rule is that distributors 
should be able to sell and advertise their goods in the same extent online as they do offline. 
However, a proprietor can demand that the re-seller fulfils conditions relating to quality 
standards, equally applied conditions on physical shops as to those online, brick and mortar 
outlets and minimum turnover requirements. To sum this up the use of trademarks online are 
a complex situation. The web is global in it is nature and trademark rights are limited to their 
respective national protection. There has been a constant increasing number of cases 
concerning this matter, so the picture will be clarified subsequently.  
 
To conclude this examination trademarks function as a legitimate barrier of trade but the 
regulations and decisions on these matters has been effective in striking a balance between 
the different interests. 
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